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LET THEM TALK AMONG THEMSELVES
The Term's Biggest First Amendment Decision
Rode to the Rescue of Free Speech on the Internet
Legal Times
Monday, July 14, 1997
Stephen J. Wermiel
In the term's most closely watched free-speech
decision, the Supreme Court took one of the newest
methods of communication-the Internet--and fit it into
one of the oldest modes of First Amendment
analysis--rigorous scrutiny of regulations based on
content. The message of Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 65 U.S.L.W. 4715 (June 26, 1997),
was loud and clear: that the court views the Internet as
a new forum for the open exchange of ideas and
information.
This intrepid First Amendment step into cyberspace
stands in sharp contrast to the court's dubious
willingness to defer to regulation of another
not-so-new communications medium--cable television.
In Turner Broadcasting System Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (March
31, 1997), the court defied expectations and upheld the
provisions of the 1992 Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act requiring cable
companies to carry some signals of local broadcast
stations.
In another, unrelated free- speech decision,
Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott Inc., 65
U.S.L.W. 4597 (June 25, 1997), the court ruled that
forcing farmers to contribute to collective advertising
campaigns--the series of ads featuring the singing
California raisins, for example--does not violate the
First Amendment. In reasoning that this coerced
speech does not involve political or ideological
messages, merely product advertising, the court may
have denigrated the importance of commercial speech,
which, until now, had been enjoying a new- found
respect under the First Amendment.
In the Spotlight
Central to these significant developments in the
free-speech arena was Justice John Paul Stevens, who
wrote both the Internet and the agricultural marketing
decisions. Now the second-most senior member of the
court (after the chief justice), Justice Stevens has
written a substantial number of the court's important
free-speech decisions in recent years-- although the
result of his ongoing involvement has not been
uniformly greater clarity in the court's First
Amendment doctrines.
By far the most important of the three decisions was
Reno v. ACLU, invalidating two provisions of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996. The CDA,
which made indecency on the Internet a crime, was
proof positive that Congress is not at its best when it
engages in knee-jerk legislative reactions to volatile
issues raised on the floor of the House or Senate. The
two CDA provisions were actually floor amendments
added to the Telecommunications Act of 1996. In the
Senate, the provisions were inserted without benefit of
hearings or committee drafting and debate.
One provision made it a crime knowingly to transmit
indecent materials over the Internet to anyone under
the age of 18. The other provision made it a crime to
display "patently offensive" materials anywhere on the
Internet where someone younger than 18 might be able
to see them.
Although a three-judge U.S. District Court had little
trouble dispatching these provisions last year, just how
the Supreme Court would go was far from clear. This
uncertainty had been created by a June 1996 decision,
Denver Area Educational Telecommunications
Consortium Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, involving
portions of the 1992 federal cable law intended to
regulate indecent programs on some cable television
channels. In an opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer, the
court fretted openly about how new communications
technologies would fit into the court's rather intricate
framework of First Amendment decisions. Upholding
one cable indecency provision and invalidating two
others, Justice Breyer wrote a year ago:
But no definitive choice among competing analogies
(broadcast, common carrier, bookstore) allows us to
declare a rigid single standard, good for now and for
all future media and purposes. ... Rather, aware
as we are of the changes taking place in the law, the
technology, and the industrial structure related to
telecommunications ... we believe it unwise and
unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy or one
specific set of words now.
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This caution about new technologies left some
observers wondering whether the court would be able
to appreciate fully the free-speech potential of the
Internet for open and unfettered communication. This
concern was exacerbated by the court's tinkering in the
Denver case with the level of First Amendment
protection, applying a "close scrutiny" test that
appeared to be a magnitude less rigorous than "strict
scrutiny."
Yet once the Supreme Court turned its attention to
the Internet, with some justices reportedly being given
demonstrations of how cyberspace navigation works,
the court was quick to conclude that the Internet
indecency restrictions were based on the content of the
speech and were not narrowly tailored to achieve
Congress' compelling interest in protecting minors
from exposure to sexually explicit materials. The court
ruled 9-0 that the prohibition on displaying indecent
material generally on the Internet was so broad that it
would interfere with a substantial amount of speech
aimed at adults and protected by the First Amendment.
The vote to strike down the prohibition on
transmission directly to individual minors was 7-2,
with Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Chief Justice
William Rehnquist dissenting.
In Reno v. ACLU, the court seemed to make a leap
from its previous reluctance to settle on a particular
analogy for handling cable free-speech issues to a
rejection of all such First Amendment analogies for the
Internet. This means that the justices will view at least
some Internet regulations as inherently suspect
restrictions of the content of speech, rather than as
efforts to regulate categories of speech that receive less
First Amendment protection.
For example, the court rejected comparisons between
the Internet and broadcasting, finding that
broadcasting is more intrusive because of the ease with
which radio and television programs are accessed and
because more affirmative steps are required to enter the
Internet and to access indecent materials there. Had
the court accepted an analogy to broadcasting, the level
of First Amendment protection would have been lower
and the justices would have been forced to defer more
broadly to the policy judgments of Congress.
In similar fashion, the court said that indecency
regulation on the Internet is not analogous to zoning
efforts to push strip joints and adult bookstores into
limited urban sectors. Nor, the court said, were the
indecency regulations like the neutral "time, place and
manner" regulations that have been upheld in other
free-speech contexts or like the obscenity definition in
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), which is
more refined than Congress' effort to say what it meant
by "patently offensive" Internet displays.
Classic Free-Speech Doctrine
With these analogies set aside, Justice Stevens'
majority opinion fell back on the basic tenets of classic
free-speech doctrine, finding that the CDA provisions
were aimed directly at the content of speech, were too
vague, and threatened to regulate too much protected
speech. "The breadth of the CDA's coverage is wholly
unprecedented," Stevens wrote. The majority also
relied on the contention of CDA opponents that
parents will be able to protect their children from
unwanted material on the Internet by using various
soon-to-be- readily-available software packages that
will block access to sexually explicit displays or
locations.
It is too soon to tell whether this reliance will be
sufficient to satisfy the moral righteousness that
prompted the Communications Decency Act in the first
place. President Clinton said in a White House report
on the Internet that he would seek to hold a summit
aimed at voluntary efforts to help parents keep their
children safe. But members of Congress are already
talking about new regulatory measures, perhaps less
sweeping than the provisions struck down by the
Supreme Court. If Congress does try again to curb
indecent material or other specific content on the
Internet, at least the First Amendment framework for
scrutinizing that effort ought to be clear.
In this term's cable decision, Turner Broadcasting,
the court upheld on a 5-4 vote another part of the same
1992 federal cable law that produced last term's
Denver ruling. In an opinion by Justice Anthony
Kennedy, the court upheld the so-called "must carry"
rules that require cable systems to carry the broadcast
signals of local over-the-air stations.
Unlike the clear message in Reno v. ACLU that the
CDA restrictions were based directly and
impermissibly on content, the court in the cable case
narrowly held to its earlier view--resolved in a first
incarnation of the case, Turner Broadcasting System
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)--that the must-carry
rules are content- neutral and therefore subject to a
lower threshold of First Amendment justification. The
court found that the need to preserve the variety of
broadcast choices available to noncable households
justified the requirement, since the proliferation of
cable systems and subscribers directly threatened the
commercial viability of broadcast outlets.
This result perpetuates the status of cable as a
medium entitled to lesser First Amendment protection
than some other forms of speech. The must- carry rule
requires cable systems to transmit programming they
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would not otherwise choose to transmit, yet the court
found the rule to be unrelated to content. That
conclusion deeply divided the court in 1994 and
continues to do so today.
In her dissenting opinion this term, joined by three of
her colleagues, Justice O'Connor even suggested that
Justice Breyer, who joined the majority opinion, was
nevertheless more sympathetic to her view that the
must-carry rule is a content- based restriction that
should fail under a strict scrutiny standard. But Breyer
would not bite and provided the fifth vote for
upholding the rule.
A similarly divided court ruled 5-4 in Glickman v.
Wileman Brothers to uphold marketing orders issued
by the secretary of agriculture that require all growers
of a particular commodity in an identified geographic
area to participate in collective marketing. This type of
marketing order, which may include contributing to
the cost of generic product advertising, was authorized
by New Deal legislation in 1937. It is what brought us
the singing California raisins, now relegated to golden
oldie status, and the current "Got milk?" campaign.
The marketing orders for California nectarines,
peaches and plums were challenged by a large
producer, who objected to being compelled to
contribute to industrywide advertising that sent
messages with which the producer disagreed.
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals struck down
the marketing orders, finding that they were not
justified as a regulation of commercial speech. But in
the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens' majority opinion
dismissed the argument that the orders violate the First
Amendment right to be free from compelled speech
and transformed the analysis into a discussion of the
proper exercise of the economic regulatory authority of
Congress. Stevens' opinion affected this transformation
by finding that agricultural growers are not identified
individually with the advertising, that they remain free
to communicate their own message through
independent advertising, and that in any event the
disputed ads do not involve political or ideological
viewpoints. Essentially, no significant free-speech
issues are presented by the marketing orders.
But the result in Glickman may be reached only by
denigrating the significance of commercial speech and
finding that an economic regulation that arguably
burdens such speech needs only minimal justification
from Congress. This is a curious turnabout. Just a year
ago, commercial speech seemed to enjoy a new degree
of First Amendment protection in the case of 44
Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495
(1996). The author of that decision was Justice
Stevens.
Perhaps the difference between this term and last
might be explained by the fact that the regulation in 44
Liquormart was an effort to prevent dissemination of
information, whereas the regulation in Glickman was
an effort to compel it. But that seems a shaky basis for
rolling back so quickly the protection of commercial
speech.
While this term's decision muffled the court's voice
on commercial speech, its opening commentary on the
Internet rang loud and clear. By preserving the
Internet as an open forum, the court helped to define
the character of this vast new means of communication
Had the court upheld the Communications Decency
Act, it would likely have been the first step in an
ever-burgeoning regulatory scheme that would have
altered, for the worse, the freewheeling character of the
Internet Members of Congress will certainly continue
trying to regulate aspects of Internet operation, but the
court's unambiguous message is that efforts to curb
Internet access will be met with strong skepticism
under the First Amendment.
Copyright 1997, Legal Times
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HIGH COURT STRIKES DOWN INTERNET SMUT LAW
The Wall Street Journal
Friday, June 27, 1997
Edward Felsenthal and Jared Sandberg
The Supreme Court has called off the traffic cops on
the information superhighway.
The court struck down a federal law designed to keep
smut off the Internet, making it much harder for
Congress and states to keep Internet users from saying
and doing whatever they want.
The 7-2 decision, which praised the vast democratic
potential of cyberspace, concluded that it is entitled to
the fullest possible free-speech protection. But the
ruling could allow for some narrow, carefully designed
regulations to protect Internet users from copyright
violations, invasions of privacy and consumer fraud.
"The interest in encouraging freedom of expression
in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but
unproven benefit of censorship," Justice John Paul
Stevens wrote for the majority.
Industry executives and free-speech advocates were
elated. "The Supreme Court has written the First
Amendment for the 21st century," said Jerry Berman,
executive director of the Center for Democracy and
Technology. Attorney Bruce Ennis, who represented
the 50-odd groups challenging the law, called the
ruling "the legal birth certificate of the Internet."
The ruling strikes down the so-called
Communications Decency Act, a provision of the 1996
Telecommunications Act that made it a crime to
transmit "indecent" material to minors, punishable by
two years in prison and a $250,000 fine. Although the
law didn't explicitly hold online services responsible
for material transmitted by users, many feared they
could be found in violation if indecent material turned
up on a site they promoted.
Internet access providers had worried that the law
would require them to continually sift through the
on-line content and communications of their
subscribers in order to avoid lawsuits. Though the
industry has responded with a variety of software tools
that prevent kids from accessing racy fare, such tools
aren't foolproof.
Had the act been upheld, "it's likely that a large
business like ours would be targeted and pulled
under," said Theodore Claypoole, corporate counsel at
commercial on-line service CompuServe Corp.
Executives have also fretted about having to abide by
conflicting Internet regulations around the world. But
George Vradenburg, senior vice president and general
counsel at America Online Inc., said the decision may
also make other countries think hard before regulating
on-line content "It's an important precedent to the rest
of the world that the U.S. is going to allow the Internet
to grow without content restrictions," he said.
In his opinion, Justice Stevens suggested several
times that a "less restrictive" statute might pass legal
muster, and conservative groups vowed to revisit the
issue. "Given the open door the court has given today,
there will be efforts to [design] a more carefully drafted
statute to protect children from pornography online,"
said Cathleen Cleaver, director of legal policy of the
conservative Family Research Council in Washington.
President Clinton said he would convene industry
groups in the coming days to help design technology
and ratings systems to protect children from "accessing
inappropriate material."
But the tone of the court's opinion, which warned at
length about the potential "chilling effects" of formal
regulation, made it clear that such efforts will be
scrutinized extremely closely. "There will be very few
ways that Congress can restrict the growth of the
Internet given the breadth of this decision," said Mr.
Ennis.
The underlying issue in the case was whether the
Internet should be treated more like broadcast
television or like print media. The court has
traditionally viewed almost any restriction on the print
media as a violation of the First Amendment. By
contrast, it has allowed greater regulation of television
because the broadcast spectrum is a finite public asset
that the federal government must divide up and
supervise to prevent chaos.
Although some lawyers had predicted a muddled
result - much like the medium level of protection the
court has given cable TV - the court made it clear that
cyberspace is a world of its own. "Unlike the
conditions that prevailed when Congress first
authorized regulation of the broadcast spectrum, the
Internet can hardly be considered a 'scarce' expressive
commodity," Justice Stevens wrote. "It provides
relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for
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communication of all kinds." Indeed, some lawyers
suggested yesterday that the court could wind up
granting the Internet even broader protection than it
offers print.
Although much has been written about several of the
justices' relative unfamiliarity with technology, the
court showed a comfortable grasp of the new medium.
Justice Stevens, who at 77 years old is the oldest
member of the court, began with a breezy, eight-page
description of the Internet that touched on everything
from "Web surfing" to computer coffee shops.
"Navigating the Web is relatively straightforward," he
said.
The Supreme Court ruling upholds the decisions of
two specially appointed panels of federal judges that
last year found the Communications Decency Act
unconstitutional. Both panels had issued injunctions
that blocked the government from enforcing it until the
high court weighed in.
The justices did let stand one small part of the law:
its prohibition on patently "obscene" speech, such as
child pornography, which has long been held subject
to regulation. But Justice Stevens said other parts of
the statute were too sweeping and ambiguous to be
rescued by "textual surgery."
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Chief Justice
William Rehnquist filed a separate opinion. They
concurred with much of the court's ruling but would
have upheld the part of the law that prohibited adults
from knowingly sending indecent material to a
"specific" minor.
The groups challenging the law included the
American Civil Liberties Union; the American Library
Association; America Online; CompuServe; Microsoft
Corp.; Wired Ventures Ltd.; the Safe Sex Page; AIDS
Education Global Information System and the
American Society of Newspaper Editors. (Reno vs.
ACLU)
Excerpts From the Ruling
- Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a
phone line can become a town crier with a voice that
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.
Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and
newsgroups, the same individual can become a
pamphleteer.
- We presume that governmental regulation of the
content of speech is more likely to interfere with the
free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.
- Moreover, the Internet is not as 'invasive' as radio
or television. . . . Users seldom encounter content 'by
accident.'
-- Justice John Paul Stevens striking down the
Communications Decency Act
Copyright C1997, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
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BIG SURPRISES IN THE INTERNET RULING
New York Law Journal
Wednesday, July 2, 1997
James C. Goodale
THE SUPREME Court's decision last week in the
Internet case (Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,
96-511) is simply stunning. It deep-sixed the
regulation on the Net of so-called indecent speech,
probably once and for all, and held the Net is entitled
to full First Amendment protection.
To say the decision is a surprise is an
understatement. There simply were no First
Amendment lawyers around who would have predicted
that the Court would hold 7-2 that the concept of
indecent speech is too vague to be enforced on the Net.
Indecent speech has been with us since 1978, when
Justice John Paul Stevens upheld its application, as
defined by the Federal Communications Commission
in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, to an afternoon radio
broadcast of George Carlin's famous satiric monologue
entitled "Filthy Words."
The Court held then that indecent speech, defined as
"patently offensive references to excretory and sexual
organs and activities," while protected by the First
Amendment, could be sanctioned by the FCC. Or to
put it another way, if a broadcast licensee broadcast too
much, or indeed any, indecent speech at the wrong
time, it could lose its license.
When the Pacifica decision came down, there was
mourning in the First Amendment community. For
the first time the Court held that "highly offensive"
speech could be penalized. Highly offensive to whom?
And how could anyone define "offensive"?
If there ever was a definition of speech that was too
vague to be enforced under the First Amendment, this
was it. First Amendment lawyers were itching,
accordingly, to get before the Court again to show the
Court the error of its ways, particularly since Pacifica
was only a plurality decision.
For four years, Howard Stern's lawyers tested the
definition articulated by the Court in proceedings
brought by the FCC, but ultimately settled for hefty
fines in 1995. His case, however, never reached the
Supreme Court.
Telephone lawyers tested the definition in litigation
involving dial-a-porn services, but the Supreme Court
in the 1989 decision Sable Communications v. FCC
brushed off attempts to hold dial-a-porn regulation of
indecent telephone speech unconstitutional because of
vagueness, holding instead that such regulation was
unconstitutional because it was overbroad, i.e., not
narrowly tailored.
Cable Ruling
Then last summer in a case involving cable TV
(Denver Area Educational Telecommunications
Consortium v. FCC), the Court found no problem in
upholding the same basic definition of indecency used
in all of the above cases (including Pacifica) in a
constitutional challenge to FCC rules requiring cable
operators to ban or block (through scrambling)
indecent programming such as Robyn Byrd's soft porn
shows in New York City.
In that case, the Court held that the basic definition
of indecency was perfectly appropriate for cable TV
and for the cable community because cable TV was
"pervasive" and likely to reach children in the home,
relying most heavily on Pacifica. Since cable was
"pervasive" it received less than full First Amendment
protection, at least for indecent speech.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer's decision in Denver was
handed down shortly after the initial decision in ACLU
by a three-judge district court in Philadelphia. In that
ruling, in June 1996, two of the three judges held the
Internet statute was unconstitutionally vague under the
First Amendment. Justice Breyer's decision was viewed
a possible signal to the litigants that the Court was not
going to follow the Philadelphia view of the alleged
vagueness of indecency.
Indeed, when a three-judge court here in New York
had an opportunity also to consider the
constitutionality of the statute in July 1996 in Shea v.
Reno, it concluded the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague, putting itself at odds with the
Philadelphia court. It held instead the statute was not
narrowly tailored, a ground the Philadelphia court had
used in addition to vagueness.
The two cases were then both appealed to the
Supreme Court and the case was argued on March 19.
There was a view the Second Circuit's opinion was
better reasoned and would be followed. It wasn't; the
Philadelphia one was. So much for reading tea leaves.
Rulings Distinguished
In his opinion in ACLU, Justice Stevens held that
previous opinions by the Court on indecency are
distinguishable and do not control the Internet case.
Pacifica does not apply because it arose out of
broadcasting, a medium that is "invasive" by nature
and has a history of extensive regulation. In addition,
because broadcasting is distributed over available
frequencies, which are scarce, the First Amendment
interests are less compelling.
The same reasoning roughly applies to cable TV. It
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too is invasive and can be regulated at least as to
indecency when there is scarcity "at its inception," i.e.,
when there are, at first, only a few, rather than a
profusion of channels. "Those factors are not present
in cyberspace," the Court flatly announced in ACLU.
Telephone, where dial-a-porn is unregulated, is
different from broadcasting because it requires an
affirmative act for a caller to dial up the porn.
Furthermore, while the Court passed over the
vagueness argument in its dial-a- porn case (Sable),
Justice Stevens pointed out that it nonetheless took
great pains to indicate that Pacifica was an
"emphatically narrow" decision.
While the definition of "indecency" may be precise
enough for radio, TV, and cable TV, Justice Stevens
concluded it is simply too vague to be enforced on the
Internet for the following reasons:
First, the Communications Decency Act (CDA) uses
two different undefined terms to describe prohibited
material: "indecent" in one section, and depictions of
"sexual or excretory activities or organs" in
terms"patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards." This lack of precision, the
Court pointed out, creates confusion in the minds of
speakers facing potential sanction.
Second, the CDA is a criminal statute, not a civil one
like the one in the Denver "ban or block" case.
Criminal laws involving indecency require higher
standards under the First Amendment than civil ones.
Third, the definition of indecency in the CDA is
vaguer than the definition of obscenity used by the
Court in its famous Miller v. California case
particularly part (b):
(a) whether the average person, applying
contemporary community standards would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in
a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) where the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value.
The second part of the Miller obscenity definition
covers sexual conduct, while indecency covers the
broader and vaguer category of "sexual or excretory
activities or organs." And further, such conduct is
actionable only as "defined by the applicable state
law," a qualification missing from the indecency
definition used in the CDA.
Stevens also pointed out that the definition of
indecency in the CDA has no requirement, as does
obscenity, of requiring a lack of serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value, or that it should be
"taken as a whole." In a nutshell, the decision
demolished the concept of indecency as a viable
concept for regulating speech under the First
Amendment, pretty much as the critics of his decision
on Pacifica have over the years.
In addition to holding the CDA too vague, Justice
Stevens also concluded the statute is overbroad, i.e.,
not narrowly tailored, despite government arguments
to the contrary.
The government argued it was narrowly tailored
principally because (1) indecent speech could be
"tagged" and identified by software, (2) the CDA
applies only to those who know the recipient is under
18, (3) it does not apply to those who require credit
card verification before displaying or sending indecent
speech.
The Court rejected all of these arguments: (1)
tagging is not technically feasible, (2) it is not possible
to know the age of a person who accesses Internet
material and (3) credit card verification is too
expensive for many non-commercial users of the Net.
While presumably Congress can draft a statute more
narrowly than the CDA to meet the Court's objections,
it is difficult to see how Congress can define indecency
in a way that survives this decision.
It is a fair guess that the regulation of indecency, as
we have known it, on the Net may very well be gone
forever. Congress can regulate obscenity on the Net as
it can regulate it anywhere else, but it is going to have
to be ingenious to come up with a definition of
indecency that is not substantially the same as the
definition of obscenity. This means indecency's life as
a concept separate from obscenity may be over.
Because Justice Stevans hammered the concept of
indecency with such deadly blows, one wonders
whether that concept might have a short life span on
other media too.
This is particularly true with respect to cable. While
the Court seems to think cable is an invasive medium
that needs governmental regulation, in the real world
of cable TV, however, parents can just as easily lock
out programs they do not want their children to watch
as they can with filtering software on the Internet.
Cable TV would therefore seem no more invasive
than the Internet and in all instances, therefore,
entitled to full First Amendment protection. Whether
in the face of continued convergence in the media, the
Court will be able to deny the full protection to other
media in the long run seems doubtful.
In sum, the case is a stunner: the regulation of
indecency may very well be dead on the Net; the Net
gets full First Amendment protection; and the Court
may be driving all media toward a convergence of First
Amendment standards so that one size fits all.
Copyright 1997, by the New York Law Publishing
Company
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HIGH COURT UPHOLDS LAW AIDING BROADCASTERS
CABLE OPERATORS CAN BE FORCED TO CARRY
LOCAL TELEVISION STATIONS
The Washington Post
Tuesday, April 1, 1997
Joan Biskupic
In a case affecting what television programming
Americans receive, the Supreme Court ruled yesterday
that cable systems can be forced to carry local
broadcast television stations. The 5 to 4 ruling was a
big victory for broadcasters that, in the face of
increasing cable dominance, are struggling to hold on
to their audience.
The decision upholds a federal law requiring cable
television operators to carry the signals of local
commercial and public broadcast television stations.
That law, part of broad 1992 cable legislation, was
intended to protect free over-the-air television
broadcasting and especially smaller broadcasters that
feared cable systems would shut them out completely.
More than 60 percent of American households
subscribe to cable, and once they do, their cable-linked
sets receive all of their TV programming, even
broadcast stations, over that system. Cable companies
eagerly carry the big three broadcast networks because
of their wide viewership. But smaller broadcasters -
such as Channel 20, Channel 50 and Howard
University's public television station in Washington -
risked being dropped by cable companies without the
protection of the federal law. Yesterday's decision
ensures that no matter how cable operators configure
their lineups, local broadcast stations will get channel
space.
Television in the late 1990s is an increasingly
competitive business, in which cable companies,
broadcasters, satellite TV services and video rental
shops compete for the loyalties of American
households. Yesterday's decision affirms a key facet of
the rules governing that competition, generally to the
disadvantage of the $25 billion-per-year cable industry.
Its companies have invested heavily to build the
systems that connect to U.S. homes. Larger members
of the industry, such as Time Warner Inc., have also
bought studios that produce programming. Seeking a
return on that spending, cable companies were eager
for increased flexibility in deciding what programming
goes onto their systems, which have fixed numbers of
channels that can be increased only at major cost.
The ruling came as a surprise to the cable industry,
which had argued that forcing operators to carry
certain broadcasts violated their First Amendment
right to free speech. Many cable operators had thought
that the "must carry" rule would be struck down and
that several channels on their systems would suddenly
be available for other programming.
"There are a lot of aspiring programmers out there,
and more ideas than there are slots," said Bruce D.
Sokler, who represents the Turner Broadcasting
System, the cable and movie conglomerate founded by
Ted Turner and now owned by Time Warner Inc.
Turner had challenged the law immediately after its
enactment.
But Bruce J. Ennis, lawyer for the National
Association of Broadcasters, which joined the Justice
Department in its defense of the law, said: " 'Must
carry' doesn't hurt the homes with cable at all, because
cable is expanding its capacity.. . . If 'must carry' had
been struck down, broadcast stations would be dropped
by cable operators. And once dropped, they would lose
advertising revenue and the quality of programnng
would decline."
The court majority yesterday noted that if cable
operators were allowed to stop carrying local
broadcasts, broadcasters would not be able to reach
most of their potential audience or earn sufficient
advertising revenue.
"Congress has an independent interest in preserving
a multiplicity of broadcasters to ensure that all
households have access to information and
entertainment on an equal footing with those who
subscribe to cable," Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote
for the court. He was joined by Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist and Justices John Paul Stevens, David H.
Souter and, for the most part, Stephen G. Breyer.
Dissenting justices argued that the federal
government failed to produce convincing evidence that
the vitality of the broadcast industry depended on the
"must carry" regulations.
"Congress has commandeered up to one-third of each
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cable system's channel capacity for the benefit of local
broadcasters, without any regard for whether doing so
advances the statute's alleged goals," said Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Justices Antonin
Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
The dissenters also suggested that because the federal
government was trying to achieve "diverse" and
"responsive" programming, it was unconstitutionally
trying to regulate the content of speech.
As cable television has grown in recent decades, it
has clashed with broadcasters competing for the same
viewers and advertisers. When the broadcasters
persuaded Congress to pass the "must carry" rules, it
argued that cable effectively could control the fate of
over-the-air TV stations.
The case of Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal
Communications Commission first came to the high
court in 1994. The justices ruled then that, because
"must carry" did not give a preference to broadcasters
based on the content of their programs, it could be
assessed under a First Amendment test that required
only that the regulation further a substantial
governmental interest to be upheld. A federal court in
the District then declared the law constitutional.
In yesterday's ruling affirming that decision,
Kennedy wrote that in the vast majority of cases, cable
operators have been able to satisfy the law using
previously unused channels. Kennedy acknowledged
that there was little evidence that local broadcasters
were going bankrupt. But he said, "Congress is under
no obligation to wait until the entire harm occurs but
may act to prevent it."
Breyer, the key fifth vote in the case, wrote separately
to observe that while the majority emphasized the
promotion of fair competition, he supported the statute
because it preserves the benefits of free, over-the-air
local broadcasts and promotes the widespread
dissemination of information.
Time Warner Entertainment Co. and several other
cable conglomerates had joined the case. C-SPAN, the
cable TV network that provides coverage of Congress,
had closely followed the case, saying that it was being
bumped off cable systems around the country in favor
of local broadcast stations.
"More than 3.5 million viewers have lost access to all
or part of the C-SPAN networks since the 'must carry'
rule became law in October 1992," C-SPAN Chairman
Brian Lamb said after the ruling. "Today, the court has
basically guaranteed that the information gap will
widen for many more."
Staff writers Paul Farhi and John Burgess
contributed to this report.
TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM v. FCC
The Supreme Court upheld a federal regulation
requiring cable systems to carry local TV broadcasters.
Cable companies had said the "must carry" law
violates their free speech rights.
THE MAJORITY
Anthony M. Kennedy
William H. Rehnquist
John Paul Stevens
David H. Souter
Stephen G. Breyer
"Congress has an independent interest in preserving
a multiplicity of broadcasters to ensure that all
households have access to information and
entertainment on an equal footing with those who
subscribe to cable."
- Kennedy
THE DISSENT
Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Clarence Thomas
"Even accepting the conclusion that a cable system
operator has a monopoly over cable services to the
home, it does not necessarily follow that the operator
also has a monopoly over all video services to cabled
households."
-- O'Connor
Copyright 1997, The Washington Post Co.
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MUST-CARRY RULING MAY AFFECT REFORM
CABLE DECISION COULD DEAL BLOW TO FREE-AIR-TIME IDEA
The National Law Journal
Monday, April 14, 1997
Marianne Lavelle, National Law Journal Staff Reporter
THE SUPREME COURT ruling that cable TV
operators can be forced to carry the signals of their
local TV broadcasters sets out a legal framework
expected to be crucial in the debate over a host of
broadcast regulation proposals-from free political
time rules to a ban on liquor ads.
Although the 5-4 court upheld the "must carry"
provisions of Congress' 1992 cable television law,
it sent a clear signal that it would view skeptically
federal regulations that appear neutral on the
surface but indirectly interfere with First
Amendment rights. Turner Broadcasting System
v. Federal Communications Commission, 95-992.
The court said that the must-carry rules,
although content-neutral, do restrain the editorial
discretion of cable companies in choosing which
stations to carry. But Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy wrote for the majority that the rules were
not unduly burdensome and furthered a legitimate
public interest-keeping local broadcast stations
alive. However, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and
the three other dissenters said that the must-carry
rules were neither necessary nor appropriate.
Neal Goldberg, the general counsel of the
National Cable Television Association, disagreed,
contending that the regulations were
"content-based because we were being forced to
carry the local broadcast stations as opposed to
other new networks viewers might prefer."
Bruce Ennis, of the Washington, D.C., office of
Chicago's Jenner & Block, who represented the
National Association of Broadcasters as amicus in
support of the FCC, said that the close vote
suggests that more content-based proposals, such
as increasing children's television programming,
forcing free air time for political candidates or
restricting ads for alcohol, might not survive future
review.
If, for example, the government forced
broadcasters to provide free political time in
exchange for the right to broadcast on a digital
channel, it would be compelling speech indirectly,
he said. Mr. Ennis believes the court would view
such a regulation-which his client, the
broadcasters, strongly oppose-as a content-based
rule subject to strict First Amendment scrutiny,
rather than the intermediate review applied to the
must-carry rules.
Copyright 1997 by the New York Law
Publishing Company
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'IN-YOUR-FACE' SPEECH WINS IN SUPREME COURT
Los Angeles Times
Saturday, February 22, 1997
David G. Savage
WASHINGTON -- Free speech of the loud,
aggressive, in-your-face variety won an important
victory in the Supreme Court this week, one that could
shape future sidewalk confrontations on matters
ranging from animal rights and union picketing to
street beggars and celebrity photographers.
The loser was the more genteel version of the l'
Amendment, the one that protects the polite exchange
of ideas and only peaceful persuasion.
Everyone agrees that the Ist Amendment protects a
person's right to speak and even to say things that are
foul and offensive. In one famous Vietnam War-era
case, the Supreme Court upheld a man's right to walk
into a Los Angeles courtroom with an obscenity
printed on his jacket.
But does a listener have rights too? At some point,
can the speaker's loud, insistent preaching in your ear
go too far and violate your right to be left alone? If he
follows you and refuses to stop, when does his free
speech violate your rights and become illegal
harassment, intimidation or even stalking?
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has not answered
these questions with any precision. But many local
judges have been forced to do so in recent years
because of mass antiabortion protests outside women's
medical clinics.
But the free-speech issue is surely not limited to
abortion. It arises when ACT UP protesters target
Catholic church leaders, when cities try to regulate
street beggars and possibly even when judges try to
shield celebrities from persistent photographers.
Lurking in all these instances is the unanswered
question about the meaning of the Ist Amendment. Is
it designed narrowly to protect civil debate and the
"marketplace of ideas," or more broadly, to also protect
a speaker's loud and intimidating demands that may
frighten the listener?
By a lopsided 8-1 margin, the Supreme Court came
down on the side of the shouting sidewalk protesters
this week and rejected the idea that pedestrians have "a
right to be left alone."
The court struck down a Buffalo judge's order that
required aggressive sidewalk protesters to stand 15
feet away as pregnant patients and staff members
walked toward a clinic that performs abortions. The
judge imposed the order after 17 months of escalating
demonstrations outside the facility. Patients should not
be "forced to run a gauntlet of harassment and
intimidation," the judge said.
But the Supreme Court concluded that the '
Amendment rights of the protesters outweigh the
privacy rights of the patients.
"This is a strong affirmation of the in-your-face view
of the 1st Amendment," said Rodney Smolla, a
free-speech expert at the College of William and Mary
Law School. "The court has rejected the notion that
listeners have a zone of privacy, or that there is a right
not to be hassled."
Smolla pointed out that in a famous 1975 case,
former First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis got a
court order requiring persistent celebrity photographer
Ron Gallela to keep his distance as she moved about in
public. "If that case were coming up again, this
[Supreme Court ruling] would give him [the
photographer] a strong 1st Amendment argument," he
said.
USC law professor Erwin Chemerinsky said that the
ruling may spell trouble for anti-panhandling laws that
are being tested in the federal courts in California.
"This case establishes a strong 1st Amendment right to
speak, even when the people say they don't want to be
spoken to," he said. "It will certainly have an
application in the begging context."
But its impact will be felt first in the abortion
conflicts.
Twice, the California Supreme Court has upheld
broad injunctions that prohibit abortion foes from
demonstrating on the sidewalk in front of a Planned
Parenthood clinic in Vallejo. Lawyers for the protesters
have asked the high court to throw out that injunction,
and the justices may do so as soon as Monday.
Meanwhile, the cities of Santa Barbara and Phoenix
have made it illegal for demonstrators to closely
approach people within 100 feet of a health care
facility. Those ordinances, now being challenged in the
courts, are also in doubt because of Wednesday's
ruling.
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Certainly an antiabortion protest led by Operation
Rescue would not be characterized as a free exchange
of ideas.
Outraged by what they see as the immorality of
abortion, Operation Rescue demonstrators in
September 1990 began crowding the sidewalks outside
a women's medical clinic in Buffalo. They were
"harassing, badgering, intimidating and yelling at"
patients as they tried to enter the facility, according to
a federal judge there. Some women were frightened
and in tears as the protesters screamed "baby killer" at
them and put a video camera in their faces.
One woman described it as "like being in the middle
of a lynch mob."
After weeks of testimony, U.S. District Judge
Richard Arcara issued an order designed to separate
the combatants and to maintain the peace. Crowds of
demonstrators were told that they could not come
within 15 feet of people or vehicles moving toward the
clinic. However, two "sidewalk counselors" were
permitted to approach a woman for "conversation of a
nonthreatening nature," but they had to "cease and
desist" if the patient requested it.
"No one is required to accept or listen to sidewalk
counseling," the judge said. Although the
demonstrators remain free to shout, chant and hold up
signs from a short distance away, the patients also
have a "right to be left alone," he said.
The full U.S. Court of Appeals in Manhattan upheld
the judge's order on a 13-2 vote. The 1st Amendment
protects "peaceful persuasion, not coercion or
obstruction," wrote Judge Ralph K. Winter. "There is
no right to invade the personal space of individuals
going about their lawful business, to dog their footsteps
and chase them down the street and to scream in their
faces."
Appealing to the Supreme Court, lawyers for the
Rev. Paul Schenck, a protest leader, mocked this new
"right not to be hassled in public." They called it a
dangerous development that threatens to "banish all
unpopular speech and expression from our public
sidewalks and streets."
Defending the injunction, lawyers for the NOW
Legal Defense Fund said that it merely creates "a
modest clear zone of 15 feet around entrances, cars and
people" that protects "medically vulnerable individuals
... from a passionate mob."
In his opinion in Schenck vs. Pro-Choice Network,
U.S. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist said that both
restrictions on sidewalk protests--the 15-foot buffer
zone and the requirement to "cease and desist'--violate
the 1st Amendment The court upheld only the 15-foot
protest-free zone at the doorway.
The law can "secure physical access" to a building,
Rehnquist said, but beyond that, there is no
"generalized right to be left alone on a public street or
sidewalk." Quoting an earlier opinion, he concluded:
"Our citizens must tolerate insulting and even
outrageous speech in order to provide adequate
breathing space to the freedoms protected by the Ist
Amendment."
Copyright 1997 The Times Mirror Company
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THE 'SCHENK' DECISION: A SOLOMONIC SOLUTION
The National Law Journal
Monday, March 10, 1997
Martha Davis and Yolanda Wu
BOTH PRO-CHOICE and anti-abortion groups
claimed victory when the Supreme Court handed down
its opinion in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network,
95-1065 (1997).
In fact, the decision, which arose from a challenge to
a court injunction providing for a fixed buffer zone and
moving bubble zone at reproductive health-care
facilities in Rochester and Buffalo, N.Y., strikes a
careful balance between the constitutional rights to free
speech and reproductive privacy.
In a Solomonic opinion, Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist strongly affirmed the state's interest in
protecting access to abortion clinics while at the same
time stressing that limitations on speech must be clear
and comprehensible, so as not to chill First
Amendment rights unduly.
Thus, the court struck down the moving bubble zone
(which dictated the distance protesters must maintain
between themselves and individual targets) while
upholding the fixed zone drawn by the lower court
(which prevents protesters from coming too close to
the clinic entrance).
Victory may be too strong a word for pro-choice
groups to use in describing this result, but the decision
does squarely reaffirm the use of several significant
tools for ensuring safe, unimpeded access to abortion
clinics and points the way to crafting even more
effective safe zones. Perhaps most significantly, the
court's opinion is silent on a matter that is likely to be
the next battleground: state and local ordinances
designed to protect access to abortion clinics.
While court-ordered injunctions are less likely to rely
on moving zones in the wake of Schenck, a number of
states and cities have enacted ordinances that provide
for both fixed and moving bubble zones to protect
access to reproductive health care facilities. For
example, a Colorado statute, as well as ordinances in
Phoenix and Santa Barbara, Calif., permit individuals
within 100 feet of health care facilities to invoke an
8-foot moving bubble zone. On Feb. 24, the Supreme
Court granted cert petitions from lower court decisions
upholding the Phoenix and Colorado laws, vacated
judgments and remanded the cases for further
consideration in light of Schenck. Given the court's
most recent actions, it is especially important that
Schenck's significance and limitations be fully
understood.
History of Violence
Schenck arose from a history of anti-choice violence,
threats and intimidation at several clinics in upstate
New York. Of the injunction provisions that were
appealed, the court upheld the fixed 15-foot buffer
zone around the clinic driveway and entrances, but
struck down the 15-foot moving bubble zone, and
upheld a cease-and-desist provision, which allows two
"sidewalk counselors" to enter the fixed zone but
requires them to retreat to a distance of 15 feet when
approached individuals indicate, verbally or
nonverbally, that they do not wish to be counseled.
The court did not reach the constitutionality of the
cease-and-desist provision for the bubble zone.
In striking down the moving bubble zone, the court
was primarily concerned that speech restrictions be
clearly defined and easily implemented. For example,
the justices expressed concern that protesters might
inadvertently stray within the confines of the moving
bubble, or be forced into the street if a patient moved
to the edge of the curb. Significantly, the court limited
its decision to this record and the geography of the
clinics in question.
Further, the court noted that "there may well be other
ways to both effect such separation and yet provide
certainty." The strong endorsement of fixed zones
elsewhere in the opinion suggests that a wide range of
such zones might be the answer-providing a fixed, safe
corridor from, say, a bus stop to the clinic entrance.
Floating zones have, in fact, rarely been used in
injunctions, so the Supreme Court's endorsement,
coupled with suggestions for expansion of the
definition of fixed zones, can provide significant help
to besieged clinics.
Schenck's rejection of the moving 15-foot bubble
zone does not automatically invalidate moving zones
in state or local ordinances. The fact that a speech
restriction is contained in an ordinance, as opposed to
a court injunction, is critically important. In Madsen
v. Women's Health Center Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994),
a decision also authored by Justice Rehnquist, the court
adopted a heightened standard for analyzing
speech-restrictive injunctions, stating that they must
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"burden no more speech than necessary to serve a
significant governmental interest." There, the court
relied on this new, heightened standard to uphold a
court injunction that imposed a 36-foot fixed buffer
zone around a Florida abortion clinic, but to strike
down a 300-foot "no approach" zone that only invited
protesters could enter. The court applied the same
heightened standard to review the Schenck injunction.
As for Ordinances...
Ordinances, however, are a different matter. Both
Schenck and Madsen made it clear that ordinances are
subject to a lower standard of scrutiny and need only
be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
Schenck eloquently reiterated the litany of
governmental interests that support limited speech
restrictions around clinics: "ensuring public safety and
order, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets and
sidewalks, protecting property rights, and protecting a
woman's freedom to seek pregnancy-related services."
While the issue of moving buffer zones in ordinances
will doubtless continue to be the subject of court
battles, Schenck's emphasis on the governmental
interests supporting such ordinances, and its
condemnation of anti-choice aggression, provide
reason for optimism that such zones will ultimately be
upheld.
In the high-stakes, contentious world of abortion
litigation, each side has its own strategic reasons for
"spinning" a decision as a win or a loss, leaving a
confused public to wonder about its real implications.
The proof of victory ultimately rests, of course, on the
impact of the decision on women's access to
reproductive choice. And on that ground, pro-choice
groups can take comfort that, in the long term, the
decision in Schenck will be a win.
Ms. Davis is the legal director and Ms. Wu is a staff
attorney at NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund,
which was co-counsel in Schenk.
Copyright 1997 by the New York Law Publishing Company
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COURT SKIRTS THE 'OFFICIAL ENGLISH' ISSUE
LANGUAGE CASE IS RULED MOOT AND RETURNED TO ARIZONA COURT
USA Today
Tuesday, March 4, 1997
Tony Mauro
The Supreme Court sidestepped the controversy over official English laws on Monday,
turning an Arizona dispute on the issue back to state courts.
The court's action has no effect on the national campaign to establish English as the
language used for most governmental functions.
Laws like Arizona's already have passed in 23 states and are pending in 10 states and
Congress. The Iowa Senate debates the issue this week.
An Arizona government employee had challenged the state's 1988 official English ballot
initiative, claiming it violated her free speech right to use Spanish and English at work. Her
suit was viewed as a crucial test of official English laws.
But the high court ruled that because the worker, Maria-Kelly Yniguez, left her state job in
1990, the case was moot.
"At that point, it became plain that she lacked a still vital claim," wrote Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg for a unanimous court.
The court was also concerned that a private group, Arizonans for Official English, had taken
on the task of defending the law after then-Gov. Rose Mofford said she would not defend it.
Ginsburg said there are "grave doubts" about whether the group had standing to participate
in the case.
The issue returns to the Arizona Supreme Court, where a live case is pending that was being
held in abeyance until the U.S. Supreme Court ruled. Once the Arizona court decides, the
issue could return to the high court in a form that the justices would be willing to take on.
Meanwhile, says Barnaby Zall, lawyer for Arizonans for Official English, the state is
expected to continue its policy of requiring official documents to be written in English, while
allowing state employees to use other languages in their daily routine.
USA Today Copyright 1997
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EDITORIAL: TIME TO MAKE AMENDS
COURT HAS CHANCE TO NULLIFY ENGLISH-ONLY RULE
The Arizona Republic
Sunday, March 23, 1997
Paul Bender
On March 3, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that
the case before it challenging the constitutionality of
Arizona's Official English amendment was moot.
Maria Yniquez, who had brought the suit, no longer
worked for Arizona's government and thus was no
longer directly affected by the amendment's apparent
requirement that all state employees speak only
English in performing their official duties.
The court, as is its practice when cases become moot
while on appeal, refused to decide the constitutional
issue before it. It also ordered that both lower federal
court decisions (which had held this amendment
unconstitutional) be wiped out.
As a result, there is still - more than eight years after
the adoption of the Official English amendment - no
definitive ruling on its meaning or constitutionality. A
non-moot case raising those issues, however, is
pending before the Arizona Supreme Court (Ruiz vs.
Symington).
Those who lived in Arizona when the Official
English amendment was narrowly adopted by the
voters in 1988 (the vote was 50.5 percent in favor) will
probably remember its basic terms. It makes the
English language "the official language of the State of
Arizona, the language of the ballot, the public schools
and all government functions and actions." It applies
to all three branches of government, to all agencies of
the state, to all local and municipal governments in
Arizona, to all "students, ordinances, rules, orders,
programs and policies" and to all government "officials
and employees during the performance of government
business."
All of these are prohibited "from using .. . language
other than English" and "shall act in English and in no
other language." The amendment exempts situations in
which the use of a language other than English is
required by federal laws, where foreign languages are
taught in school and where languages other than
English are needed "to protect public health or safety"
or "the rights of criminal defendants or victims of
crime." Any state resident or anyone doing business in
Arizona is given the right to bring suit to enforce the
amendment in court.
The Arizona Supreme Court is faced with several
difficult issues in the Ruiz case.
Most central, is whether the amendment is
constitutional. Ordinarily, when a state supreme court
is inclined to invalidate a state law on constitutional
grounds, it is free to invoke either the state or the
federal Constitution for this purpose. Use of the state
Constitution, when possible, has at least one distinct
advantage: A state court decision that a state law
violates the state Constitution cannot be reviewed by
the U.S. Supreme Court. If a state court strikes down
state law on federal constitutional grounds, however,
that decision can - and often will - be reviewed in
Washington.
Since Official English is not an ordinary law, but an
amendment to Arizona's Constitution, the Arizona
Supreme Court probably cannot use the state
Constitution in Ruiz. Any such decision will have to
rest on the federal Constitution, with the consequent
danger of reversal by the Rehnquist Court, which is not
ordinarily a strong champion of minority rights or
individual liberties.
The two federal courts that invalidated Official
English (before their decisions were erased by the U.S.
Supreme Court on March 3) did so on the grounds that
the amendment violates the free expression provided
by the U.S. Constitution. Many lawyers find that
conclusion questionable. It is true that Official English
does directly limit the expression of state and local
government employees and officials. But government
employees ordinarily do not have full speech rights
when on duty. For instance, state office workers can be
told not to make political speeches to other workers or
members of the public while on the job; state police
can be told not to debate controversial public issues
while making arrests or questioning witnesses.
Elected government officials appear to have the
strongest claim to constitutionally protected free
expression while at work. Legislators, for example,
should probably be free to address their colleagues and
constituents on any issue - and in any language - they
choose. In addition, ordinary citizens would seem to
have a constitutional right to write or speak to
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legislators and government officials in the language
they (the citizens) feel most comfortable using. (The
Official English amendment does not purport to
regulate the speech of private citizens.) This
constitutional right to petition the government would
be undercut if officials were absolutely prohibited from
responding to citizens in the language the citizens use
and can best understand.
Some applications of Official English thus may be
invalid as violations of free speech, but the Arizona
Supreme Court - and the U.S. Supreme Court - may
not find those invalidities a sufficient basis for voiding
the entire amendment. Concentrating on the
amendment's interference with the political process
also ignores what many people consider the worst
aspect of Official English - its apparent prohibition of
the use of any language other than English in
providing government services and benefits to, and
writing rules and regulations for, Arizonans with
limited command of English. An English-only policy
may seriously discriminate against these people.
The federal Constitution provision that bears most
directly on this issue is the equal protection clause.
Those whose primary language is not English may
clearly be disadvantaged if state law prohibits any arm
of the state - including those who work for the state -
from communicating with them in a language they can
understand. Decisions by an increasingly conservative
U.S. Supreme Court, however, make it uncertain
whether that court would agree that this kind of
discriminatory effect violates the Constitution.
The Arizona Supreme Court may be tempted to deal
with this situation by giving the Official English
amendment a narrow construction that will eliminate
most or all of its constitutional problems. (As with
other purely state law issues it - rather than the U.S.
Supreme Court - has the final say on what Official
English means). Former Arizona Attorney General
Bob Corbin tried to do just that in 1989 when he
issued an opinion that the amendment permitted
government employees to use languages other than
English to facilitate the "fair and effective delivery of
governmental services" so as not to "unreasonably
disadvantage non-English speakers." He also stated
that while "official acts" - documents such as statutes,
ordinances, agency rulings and regulations, and court
decisions - have to be in English, the amendment
permits "translation services" and "communications
between elected and other governmental employees
with the public at large . .. in a language other than
English."
An Arizona attorney general's opinion does not have
the force of law, but the sponsors of the Official
English amendment have told the Arizona courts that
they agree with Corbin's interpretation. If the current
governor and attorney general, who are defendants in
Ruiz, also tell the Arizona Supreme Court that they
agree, a basis may exist for that court effectively to
nullify any practical impact of the Official English
amendment, while avoiding constitutional
pronouncements that the U.S. Supreme Court might
reverse.
A final option for the Arizona Supreme Court would
be to dismiss the Ruiz case without interpreting the
amendment because the defendants in that case are not
threatening to enforce the amendment. Moreover,
although the amendment gives any Arizonan standing
to bring suit to enforce it, no such suit appears to exist.
It would seem unfortunate, however, to leave the
amendment's apparently broad language intact without
any limiting construction or determination of the
amendment's constitutionality. It may be impossible for
any court completely to remedy the insult felt by many
Arizonans by the passage of Official English in 1988,
but it would certainly be useful if Arizona's Supreme
Court could confirm that the amendment at least has
no harmful practical impacts.
Paul Bender is professor at ASU's Law School. He is
former dean of the school and was principal deputy
solicitor general of the United States from 1993-1996.
He opposed adoption of the Official English
amendment.
Copyright 1997 Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.
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CALIFORNIA JUSTICES SKEPTICAL OF PRODUCE-AD LAW
HIGH COURT APPEARS TO DOUBT GOVERNMENT'S ROLE
IN REQUIRING FARMERS TO SUPPORT GENERIC ADVERTISING
Los Angeles Times
Tuesday, December 3, 1996
David G. Savage
WASHINGTON -- In skeptical questioning Monday,
the justices of the Supreme Court sharply disputed the
need for the government to require agricultural
producers to pay for generic advertising to promote their
products.
The requirements, in the form of federal and stategovernment "marketing orders" that collect as much as
a combined $1 billion a year, are deeply rooted inCalifornia farming on products ranging from milk topeaches.
"What's the government's interest here? That's what Idon't understand," Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said in
the opening moments of Monday's argument.
Added Justice Antonin Scalia, "This sounds like
something time-warped out of the 1930s," when thegovernment during the New Deal era tried to make itself
a partner with industry.
The marketing programs indeed stem from a New
Deal-era law, the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937.But during the 1960s and '70s, federal officials
expanded their marketing-control efforts through generic
advertising programs funded by growers.
These days, their simple messages appear onbillboards--"It's the Cheese"--or in newspaper and TV
ads for beef, milk and raisins. Some promotions are
nationwide, administered under federal marketing
orders, while other programs tout the products ofindividual states--Florida oranges, for example.California has 47 promotion programs for commodities
produced in the state.
But these mandatory payments have come under attackfrom some producers in California's fertile CentralValley. They say their peaches, plums and nectarines aredistinctive, and they resent paying for promotions that
suggest all peaches are the same.
Last year, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in SanFrancisco ruled in their favor, saying the assessments for
advertising violate the 1st Amendment by forcing them
to help their competitors.
If the high court were to agree, the decision could
unravel many of the promotional efforts.
Defending the programs, Assistant Solicitor Gen. AlanJenkins said they have"overwhelming support" in theindustry. Recent votes among peach producers found that
more than 75% supported generic advertising, he said.
Responding to questions, he said that the government'sinterest is in maintaining "orderly markets." But he
struggled to explain why forced advertising is a
necessary element.
If promotional programs are so important, asked
Justice David H. Souter, why is there a federal marketing
program for California peaches but not Georgia peaches?
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wondered whether
the beer industry, seeing the growth of microbreweries,
could demand a government-funded program of forced
assessments to promote generic American beer.
Jenkins replied that federal officials would have to
judge whether such a program was important and
needed.
"So you think beer is less important than peaches,"Scalia interjected.
In an unusual twist, Fresno attorney Thomas E.
Campagne won the right to present a 30-minute
argument for peach growers against the forced
assessments.
From the beginning of the case in 1988, Campagne had
represented 16 growers and handlers who opposed the
government program. But when the case reached the
high court, a majority of the growers concluded they
should be represented by a Ist Amendment specialist.
They chose University of Chicago professor Michael
McConnell, an experienced advocate in the high court.
But Campagne, supported by some of the growers,
refused to step aside. Last week, the dispute came to a
head, and the two sides agreed to settle it with a coin tossin the clerk's office.
"We flipped and I lost," McConnell said Monday.
The growers may have lost too. The Fresno lawyer
rattled off details about the handling of plums and
peaches, and cited a series of stipulations from the lower
court record. But the justices, expecting to hear a l'Amendment argument, soon showed frustration.
"We have an awful lot of details floating around here,"
said Justice John Paul Stevens.
"What is the Ist Amendment problem? You haven't
answered that," an exasperated Justice Sandra DayO'Connor said after 15 minutes.
Campagne said his clients do not want to be "forced to
associate with their competitors," the other peach
growers. "All California peaches are not the same."
Although most of the justices sounded as though they
opposed the government program, several seemed less
certain after hearing Campagne. A decision in the case
of Glickman vs. Wileman Brothers, 95-1184, can be
expected in several months.
Copyright 1996 The Times Mirror Company
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THE SUPREME COURT: GROUP ADVERTISEMENTS;
AGRICULTURAL MARKETING EFFORT IS RULED CONSTITUTIONAL
The New York Times
Thursday, June 26, 1997
Linda Greenhouse
A narrowly divided Supreme Court today upheld a
new Deal-era Federal marketing program that requires
agricultural companies to help pay for industry-wide
advertising.
Rejecting a lower court's view that the advertising
assessments amounted to compelled speech, in
violation of the First Amendment, the majority said the
program was an unexceptional form of economic
regulation that was well within the power of Congress
and did not pose any First Amendment concerns.
Writing for the Court in a 5-to-4 decision, Justice
John Paul Stevens said the Court's cases about
compelled speech were "clearly inapplicable to the
regulatory scheme at issue here." For example, he said,
those cases have protected people from having to salute
the flag or attach license plates with unwanted slogans
to their cars.
Justice Stevens said that in requiring the growers of
California fruits to underwrite advertising campaigns
urging Americans to eat more fruit in general, and
California fruit in particular, the Government was
neither imposing an ideology nor preventing the
objecting growers from paying for additional
advertising of their own brands.
The dissenters said the Court had devalued the First
Amendment interests at stake by not applying an
analysis that required the Government to justify
restrictions on commercial speech as "narrowly
tailored" for "substantial" interests.
Justice David H. Souter said that under the Court's
precedents, compelling speech "is just as suspect as
suppressing it, and is typically subject to the same level
of scrutiny."
The opinion by Justice Stevens essentially tracked the
Clinton Administration's defense of the program, part
of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937.
The outcome was somewhat surprising given the
Court's recently protective stance toward protective
speech, which has led it recently to invalidate several
state and Federal laws regulating advertising and
labeling.
The voting pattern was also surprising, with Justices
on opposite sides from where their previous opinions
would seem to have placed them. The majority was
joined by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who rarely
rejects a First Amendment argument, and by Justices
Sandra Day O'Connor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen G. Breyer.
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion was joined by
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, who only rarely
votes to strike down a Government program, and by
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, who
also filed a dissenting opinion of his own.
The case, Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott,
No. 95-1184, was brought by a group of growers and
processors of California nectarines, peaches and plums
to protest their assessments for the generic advertising
program. They argued that they would rather spend
their money advertising their own products rather
than, as they saw it, subsidizing their competitors.
Several million dollars were at stake in the case; the
assessments generate some $10 million a year to
advertise the produce at issue. Other commodities,
including beef, are covered by similar Federal
programs, which Justice Stevens described as
incorporating a "police of collective, rather than
competitive marketing" for farm products.
The Federal District Court in Sacramento rejected
the growers' challenge, but the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in San Francisco,
declared the program unconstitutional. The appeals
court said, "The First Amendment right of freedom of
speech includes a right not to be compelled to render
financial support for others' speech."
The court relied in part on a series of Supreme Court
cases holding that employees who object to union
membership or who object to the way a union spends
its money cannot be required to support union
activities beyond the basic collective bargaining
function. But the generic advertising program did not
raise those concerns, Justice Stevens said.
"None of the advertising in this record promotes any
particular message other than encouraging consumers
to buy California tree fruit," he said, adding that the
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assessments "cannot be said to engender any crisis of
conscience."
Justice Stevens continued, "The mere fact that
objectors believe their money is not being well spent
does not mean that they have a First Amendment
complaint."
In his dissent, Justice Souter said, "The very reasons
for recognizing that commercial speech falls within the
scope of First Amendment protection likewise justifies
the protection of those who object to subsidizing it
against their will."
He said the program was "so randomly implemented"
that it could not survive even a moderate level of First
Amendment scrutiny.
There was also an unusual voting lineup in a
separate, unrelated case today. The Justices voted 5 to
4 to uphold a Florida State Senate district, drawn to
increase representation for black voters, against a
challenge by a district resident that the district was the
product of an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.
Since the Court embarked four years ago on its strict
scrutiny of legislative districts drawn with race in
mind, it has not upheld any of the districts it has
examined.
While this was a procedurally unusual case that dealt
with a Federal District Court's authority in drawing the
district rather than directly with the question of race,
it was nonetheless notable that Chief Justice Rehnquist
joined Justice Souter's opinion in upholding the
district. The others in the majority were Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
The group that Chief Justice Rehnquist had
previously voted with in every one of this series of
redistricting cases comprised the dissenters: Justices
Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy and Thomas. The Chief
Justice did not write a separate opinion to explain his
position.
The case, Lawyer v. Dept. of Justice, No. 95-2024,
concerned a district in the Tampa area that a
three-judge Federal District Court redrew last year
after earlier, more heavily black and geographically
irregular district had become presumptively
unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's recent
rulings.
The District Court did not declare the earlier district
unconstitutional. Rather, it approved revisions that
were the product of settlement discussions among all
parties to the case except for the objecting resident, C.
Martin Lawyer II, who challenged the District Court's
authority.
In his opinion today, Justice Souter said both that the
District Court had authority over the case and that its
conclusion that race was not the predominant factor in
the final lines was justified by the evidence. The
dissenters disputed the court's authority but did not
address the question of the district's constitutionality.
Copyright 1997 The New York Times Company
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96-779 ARKANSAS EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION COMMISSION V. FORBES
Ruling below (CA 8, 93 F.3d 497, 24 MedLRptr 2295):
Televised debate among major party candidates for seat in Congress staged by
state-owned television station is limited public forum from which legally qualified
independent candidate may not be excluded merely because station does not consider him
"viable."
Questions presented: (1) Is debate between political candidates, organized and broadcast
by state public television network, limited public forum (as held below) or non-public forum,
as Eleventh Circuit has held in direct reliance on this court's public forum cases? (2) Does
First Amendment protect editorial judgments of state public television network that, free
from political interference, applies rational, viewpoint-neutral policies in making journalistic
decisions to shape debate (including selection of participating candidates), as Eleventh
Circuit has held in direct conflict with Eighth Circuit's judgment below?
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COURT AGREES TO DECIDE DISPUTE OVER TV DEBATE
The Associated Press Political Service
Monday, March 17, 1997
Richard Carelli
WASHINGTON (AP) _ The Supreme Court today
agreed to decide whether a state-owned Arkansas
network violated a political candidate's rights when it
excluded him from a 1992 televised debate.
The court's ruling, expected sometime in 1998, could
carry great importance for public broadcasting stations
nationwide.
A federal appeals court ruled against the Arkansas
network, a decision the justices were told casts a "chill
on state-related public broadcasters' editorial
freedoms."
The Clinton administration had urged the court to
hear the network's appeal.
The dispute arose when editors for the Arkansas
Educational Television Network (AETN) decided that
independent congressional candidate Ralph P. Forbes'
participation in a televised debate the network was
sponsoring "would detract from the debate's usefulness
to its intended audience."
The network, comprised of public TV stations, chose
to invite only the Democratic and Republican
candidates for the district in which Forbes was
runmng.
Forbes sued, and a federal jury ruled in 1995 that his
exclusion had not violated his free-speech rights.
But the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
that ruling last year. The appeals court treated the
televised debate as a limited public forum that
presumably was open to all qualified candidates.
AETN's editors could exclude such a candidate only
for a compelling reason that was the least intrusive on
that candidate's free-speech rights, the appeals court
ruled. It sent Forbes' case back so the trial court to
decide what monetary damages he was owed.
Government-owned TV stations cannot defend
themselves against such lawsuits by claiming the
debates they sponsor are for "viable" candidates only,
the appeals court said. "To uphold such a defense
would, in our view, place too much faith in the
government."
The 8th Circuit court added: "We have no doubt that
the decision as to political viability is exactly the kind
of journalistic judgment routinely made by news
people. But a crucial fact here is that the people
making this judgment were not ordinary journalists
they were employees of the government."
The ruling would not affect broadcast debates
sponsored by privately owned TV stations or other
non-government entities. The reason: only the
government or a government agent, not private
citizens, can violate someone's constitutional rights.
In the appeal acted on today, lawyers for AETN
argued that the appeals court ruling has a chilling
effect on public TV stations in seven states - Arkansas,
Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota
and South Dakota.
Clinton administration lawyers noted in a
friend-of-the-court brief that other federal appeals
court rulings have treated public stations' editors the
same as those who work for privately owed stations.
Government lawyers urged the justices to reverse the
appeals court ruling and "preserve the editorial
discretion that (government-owned stations) have
traditionally exercised over the content of their news
programs."
The case Arkansas Educational
Commission vs. Forbes, 96-779.
Copyright 1997. The Associated Press.
All rights reserved.
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HIGH COURT GIVES FORBES A HEARING
AETN TO TELL WHY IT KEPT HIM OFF THE AIR
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette
March 18, 1997, Tuesday
Linda Friedlieb
Ralph Forbes didn't get his say in 1992 during a
congressional debate broadcast on public television,
but his plea for access will be heard by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to decide
whether a state-owned TV station can exclude fringe
candidates from political forums.
The decision would affect most public TV stations
around the nation, and possibly a host of other publicly
owned media such as radio and TV stations owned by
public colleges and universities or other local
governing bodies.
The court will hear arguments on the conflict
between the stations' right to control their editorial
content and the candidate's right to be heard through
publicly controlled forums.
The Conway-based Arkansas Educational Television
Network appealed a decision by the 8th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals in St. Louis that Forbes' First
Amendment rights were violated when he was
excluded from a 1992 debate. At the time, station
officials considered Forbes a "fringe candidate" in the
race for the state's 3rd Congressional District seat.
The station told the Supreme Court the appeals court
decision casts a "chill on state-related public
broadcasters' editorial freedom."
"AETN believes this case presents a fundamental
challenge to the freedom of the press of every state
public broadcasting network and every public
television and radio station licensed to a state
university, community college or school board," Susan
Howarth, AETN's executive director, said Monday.
Forbes, a former American Nazi Party member from
London, said Monday he believed that 3rd
Congressional District voters deserved compensation
of $10,000 each for not being allowed to make
informed decisions. He also said he felt the prohibition
on excluding candidates should be extended to
commercial television stations, because they are
licensed by the government.
"If you have a tiny group of arrogant, Orwellian
aristocrats determining what the people hear, you have
a tainted ballot," he said. "More important than my
rights or the rights of any other candidate of any other
viewpoint, are the rights of the voters."
Forbes also said he was both surprised and
disappointed the Supreme Court decided to hear the
case because the justices had previously denied his
requests to deal with the case on different issues. He
said the Rutherford Law Institute, a Virginia-based
conservative organization, is going to assist him before
the Supreme Court.
A Supreme Court decision is expected sometime in
1998. The decision will not affect privately owned
television stations or other nongovernmental groups.
In 1992, Forbes filed suit against AETN after the
state-owned system excluded him from a debate
between Republican candidate Tim Hutchinson and
Democratic candidate John VanWinkle.
Network executives contended they excluded Forbes
- who now calls himself a Christian supremacist -- not
because of his views but because a lack of
organization, media coverage, funding and volunteers
kept him from being a viable candidate in the race.
Forbes lost the election, receiving only 6,329 votes,
roughly 2.5 percent of the total. Hutchinson won the
race with 125,295 votes. VanWinkle got 117,775
votes.
A federal jury that heard the case in Fort Smith
before U.S. District Judge B. Franklin Walters in June
1995 found in favor of the Conway-based television
network.
Forbes appealed to the 8th Circuit, which found the
candidate's rights were violated. The appeals court
ruled in August that the TV network was a government
agency and could not therefore make editorial
decisions.
"We have no doubt that the decision as to political
viability is exactly the kind of journalistic judgment
routinely made by news people. But a crucial fact here
is that the people making this judgment were not
ordinary journalists - they were employees of the
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government," the appeals court said.
The appeals court decision affects Arkansas, Iowa,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota and
South Dakota. In Nebraska last year, public television
stations canceled a scheduled senatorial debate
between Republican and Democratic candidates after
lesser-known candidates demanded to be included.
The Clinton administration urged the Supreme Court
to hear the case, as did a coalition of groups involved
with public television.
Lonna Thompson, director of legal affairs for the
Association of America's Public Television Stations,
said the appeals court's decision has already had a
national impact, including the cancellation of debates
by some public television stations.
"The effect is definitely not in the public interest
because you'll have stations not airing debates or news
programs, anything that could be considered a public
forum," she said.
Thompson said conflicting decisions on the issue
made the Supreme Court's decision to hear the case
crucial.
In another 8th Circuit case from Iowa, a three-judge
panel ruled a candidate from the Natural Law Party did
not need to be included in a news program featuring
the other candidates from his race. That case is
pending before the full panel of the appeals court,
Thompson said.
Howarth said the appeals court's decision forced
AETN to include three additional candidates in
debates held for the 1996 election. In the past, she
said, station executives would have looked at
campaigns to see if candidates were viable before
issuing invitations.
"In 1992, we really studied the law. This issue had
come up in a number of states," she said. "The courts
had all determined that we could make that decision
like any other editorial body.... We've always felt as a
public broadcaster that we need to have the freedom to
make the same editorial decision any journalist would
make."
Copyright 1997 Arkansas Democrat-Gazette
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MUST FRINGE CANDIDATES GET TIME?
The Post and Courier (Charleston, SC)
Saturday, January 18, 1997
James J. Kilpatrick, Universal Press Syndicate
Ralph P. Forbes won his case in Arkansas. Jay B.
Marcus lost his case in Iowa. Same law. Same facts.
Same appellate circuit. The bizarre situation has left
the news directors of public television with one more
furrow in their worried brows.
In the congressional elections of 1992, three
candidates qualified to run in the 3rd District of
Arkansas: a Democrat, a Republican and Independent
Ralph P. Forbes. A month or so before the election, the
Arkansas Educational Television Network (AETN)
arranged a debate.
A question arose: Should Forbes be invited to
participate? The gentleman is widely regarded in
Arkansas as a right-wing oddball. In repeated tries for
public office he had drawn scant support. He had no
staff, no campaign headquarters, no significant money.
Few voters came to his rallies. In the sound judgment
of AETN's news people, Forbes' candidacy was simply
"not viable." His views in a three-way debate would not
illuminate the issues.
Acting on that professional judgment, AETN invited
only the major-party candidates. On Oct. 22 the
two-man debate took place. Forbes went into U.S.
District Court and sued for violation of his First
Amendment rights.
After some procedural delay, a jury found that the
decision to exclude Forbes (1) was not the result of
political pressure and (2) was not based on opposition
to Forbes' political opinions. The trial judge ruled that
the debate was a "non-public forum" and could be
limited by the network to invited guests only.
On Aug. 21 the 8th Circuit reversed that decision.
Speaking through Chief Judge Richard S. Arnold, a
three-judge panel frowned upon the network's editorial
decision that Forbes' candidacy was not viable. Such a
subjective judgment is not legally sufficient. The
educational TV network is "governmentally owned and
controlled." Its journalists are not ordinary journalists;
they are governmental employees. To uphold the
network's defense, said Judge Arnold, "would place too
much faith in government."
Meanwhile, an almost identical case was moving
along in Iowa. There Jay B. Marcus and others
qualified as candidates for the House and Senate,
representing the Natural Law Party and the Working
Class Party. They sued Iowa Public TV for excluding
them from debates on a popular program called Iowa
Press. The network's editors had concluded that
Marcus and colleagues were "not newsworthy." The
excluded candidates could appear on other programs
prior to the election, but not on Iowa Press.
The candidates lost. They appealed, and the case
went up to a different panel of the 8th Circuit. On Oct.
11 this panel, speaking through Judge Frank J. Magill,
affirmed the trial court and came down in favor of the
TV editors. True, said the court, IPTV is an agency of
the state of Iowa, "but it is also a media organization
which necessarily must make editorial decisions
regarding the content of its programming."
Judge Arnold's contrasting opinion in Arkansas
sticks out like crabgrass on a putting green. Not only
in his own 8th Circuit, but in the 11th Circuit also,
judges repeatedly have upheld the right of state-owned
media to make reasoned editorial decisions.
Many universities operate radio stations as part of
their training in journalism. Bar associations have
newsletters. Law schools publish law reviews. Student
newspapers carry letters to the editor. Governmental
Web sites blossom. Bulletin boards abound. Public
schools have inter- office mail service. State and
federal agencies raise community funds for selected
nonprofit charities, but this does not mean that the Flat
Earth Society has a constitutional right to come
aboard. Someone must decide what goes and what
stays.
If Judge Arnold's opinion should be affirmed by the
Supreme Court, the regrettable consequences can
easily be seen. Instead of two-man debates, there will
be no-man debates. That is what happened last
summer in Nebraska, where the state's educational TV
canceled a debate between senatorial candidates rather
than sponsor a sideshow.
It is remarkably easy to get on the ballot in many
states. One hundred signatures suffice in New Jersey.
Tennessee requires but 25. Given the lure of a free
appearance on TV, every kook, crackpot, tree-hugger
and single-taxer will think about running for office.
If discretion is taken from editors, where is discretion
to be lodged? Judge Arnold has little faith in the
judgment of journalists. With deference to this
distinguished jurist, it has to be said that some of us
often have even less faith in the judgment of judges.
Distributed by Universal Press Syndicate
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Ralph P. FORBES, and The People, Appellants,
V.
The ARKANSAS EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION COMMISSION, et al., Appellees,
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
93 F.3d 497
Decided Aug. 21, 1996
... RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.
This case is before us for the second time. On the prior appeal, this Court, sitting en banc, held that the plaintiff,
Ralph P. Forbes, had stated a claim. The case arises out of a debate staged by the defendant Arkansas Educational
Television Commission, an agency of the State of Arkansas, between the Democratic and Republican candidates
for Congress in the Third District of Arkansas in 1992. Mr. Forbes, who was also a legally qualified candidate in
that race, asked to be included in the debate but was refused. He claimed, among other things, that his exclusion
violated the First Amendment, as made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. We held that the First Amendment applied fully to the Arkansas Educational Television Network
(AETN), and that the defendants were not free to exclude Mr. Forbes without a reason good enough to pass muster
under that Amendment. The case had not progressed far enough for defendants to file an answer. Hence, there
was no way of knowing, on the state of the record as it then existed, why AETN had excluded Mr. Forbes. The
case was remanded for further proceedings.
On remand, the plaintiffs First Amendment claim was tried to a jury. By special verdicts, the jury found that
the decision to exclude the plaintiff from the debate was not the result of political pressure, and that it was not
based on opposition towards plaintiffs political opinions. In addition, the District Court instructed the jury that
the congressional debate, as set up by the defendant network, was a non-public forum. Judgment was entered for
defendants.
Mr. Forbes now appeals. He argues that the debate was a limited public forum, and that the reason given for
excluding him, that he was not a "viable" candidate, even if it was the true reason, was not legally sufficient. We
agree. We hold that a governmentally owned and controlled television station may not exclude a candidate, legally
qualified under state law, from a debate organized by it on such a subjective ground. To uphold such a defense
would, in our view, place too much faith in government.
I.
We briefly restate enough of the facts and proceedings below to place the present issue in context. In October
1992, the Arkansas Educational Television Commission decided to conduct and broadcast a debate between the
Republican and Democratic candidates for Congress in the Third District of Arkansas. The plaintiff, Ralph P.
Forbes, then became a duly qualified independent candidate under state law. He was certified as an independent
candidate because he had gathered enough signatures on petitions. Under state law, a candidate must file petitions
signed by at least three per cent. of the qualified electors in the district in which he is seeking office, provided,
however, that no more than 2,000 signatures are required. Mr. Forbes heard about the debate and asked to be
included. AETN refused, and the debate took place on October 22, 1992, without Mr. Forbes's participation. In
the meantime, the plaintiff had filed suit in the District Court, seeking a preliminary injunction, but this relief was
denied. Thereafter, the District Court granted AETN's motion to dismiss the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim.
The plaintiff appealed, and this Court, sitting en banc, affirmed in part and reversed in part. We rejected Mr.
Forbes's claim under the Federal Communications Act, holding that s 315 of that Act does not create a private cause
of action. As to the First Amendment claim, however, we held that Forbes's pleading was sufficient to survive a
motion under Rule 12(b)(6). The defendants argued that the case should be governed by public-forum analysis.
In response to this position, we held that governmentally owned television stations are not traditional public fora,
but that they might, under the particular circumstances of any given case, create a limited public forum, "a place
that generally is not open for public expression, but that the government has opened for use for free speech for only
a limited period of time, a limited topic, or a limited class of speakers." We added:
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Since the key determination of whether a forum is a limited public one is the government's
acquiescence in its use for expressive purposes, it is certainly possible that AETN created a limited
public forum when it chose to sponsor a debate among the candidates for the Third Congressional
seat. This is a determination the factfinder would have to make after carefully looking at the nature
of the debate forum. If it were determined that AETN had created a limited public forum, then
Forbes would have a First Amendment right to participate in the debate and could be excluded only
if AETN had a sufficient government interest.
Observing that "AETN ... has not yet articulated any principled reason for excluding Forbes," we remanded for
further proceedings.
On remand, as we have previously noted, the District Court tried the case to a jury. In accordance with our en
banc opinion, the Court correctly refused to submit to the jury any claim under the Communications Act itself.
Only the First Amendment claim was submitted. But before the case went to the jury, the District Court held, as
a matter of law, that the debate in question was a non-public forum. The District Court said: "... the Court has
ruled that the type of forum we are talking about in this case is a non-public forum." Thus, the question whether
the debate was a non-public forum or a limited public forum was not submitted to the fact finder. It was taken from
the jury and decided by the Court. The issue whether defendants' proffered justification--that Forbes was not a
viable candidate--would be legally sufficient if the debate were a limited public forum was not reached. Instead,
the District Court submitted to the jury only those discrete issues of fact that it deemed relevant under its holding
that the debate was a non-public forum.
On special verdicts, the jury found, first, that the decision to exclude Mr. Forbes was not the result of any political
pressure coming from outside the professional staff of AETN. (Under the theory presented by defendants at the
trial, this would have been the only basis for a recovery by the plaintiff.) The jury found, in addition, that the
defendants did not exclude Mr. Forbes from the debate because of disagreement with his opinions. In accordance
with these findings of fact and the Court's holding on the public-forum issue, judgment was then entered for
defendants.
II.
We first discuss three procedural arguments made by Mr. Forbes as part of his attempt to upset the judgment of
the District Court. The first argument has to do with the special interrogatories put to the jury. The first of these
interrogatories read as follows:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants' decision to exclude Mr.
Forbes from the debate was influenced in any way by political pressure from anyone inside or outside
of the Arkansas Educational Television Network?
The jury answered no to this question. Mr. Forbes's argument is that this interrogatory was unnecessary to a
finding that AETN violated his First Amendment rights, and that submitting it to the jury was confusing. We do
not agree that use of the interrogatory was reversible error.
Whether to submit a case on special interrogatories, and, if so, how to phrase them, are matters committed, within
broad limits, to the discretion of the district courts. We have no reason to believe that this jury was confused. We
have great faith injuries, and their desire and ability to follow instructions and make distinctions among the various
issues put before them. It may be true that submission of this special interrogatory, strictly speaking, was
unnecessary. The First Amendment can be violated even if no political pressure is exerted. For example, officials
of AETN, entirely apart from political pressure, might have decided to exclude Mr. Forbes because of disagreement
with his political opinions. (As we have seen, the jury found that this did not occur, but, at the time the case was
submitted to the jury, this was still a live issue.) It is very likely that the exertion of political pressure, if it had
occurred, would have been a good theory of First Amendment violation, because such pressure, in all probability,
would have proceeded out of someone's disagreement with or prejudice against Mr. Forbes's political positions.
The jury's negative answer to the interrogatory did not mean that the case was over; it meant only that one possible
theory of liability had been rejected. The jury remained free to consider the other interrogatories submitted to it,
and we believe it did so conscientiously.
The jury then went on to answer the second interrogatory, asking whether the decision to exclude Mr. Forbes was
based on disagreement with his political viewpoint. The answer to this question was no. We do not know what
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our answer would have been if we had been sitting on the jury, but that is not important. There was conflicting
evidence on this issue, and it could have gone either way. Making decisions of this kind is exactly what juries are
for. It was within the discretion of the District Court to submit the issue to the jury in this form, and the evidence
is sufficient to support its negative answer.
Mr. Forbes also argues that it was prejudicial error to exclude evidence which, he contends, would have shown
that the husband of the producer of the debate for AETN was prejudiced against him. We cannot agree that any
error was committed in this regard. If we assume that the husband did not like Mr. Forbes's opinions, and if we
further assume, and this would be something of a stretch on the present record, that his wife knew this, it by no
means follows that the wife was in agreement. Spouses' political opinions sometimes agree. They sometimes
disagree. We do not think any general inference can be drawn from the opinion of one spouse to that of the other.
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this evidence.
III.
It remains to discuss what has emerged as the main issue-whether the congressional debate staged by AETN was
a limited-purpose public forum, or a non-public forum, and, if it was the former, whether AETN's reason for
excluding Mr. Forbes can survive scrutiny under the First Amendment. (We agree with the District Court that the
jury's finding that the exclusion was not viewpoint-based is fatal to Mr. Forbes's case if the debate was a non-public
forum.) That this is the major issue in the case became clear at oral argument. Counsel for defendants, citing
BoseCorp. v. Consumer's Union, argued that the issue of how to characterize the forum was properly decided by
the judge. Certain First Amendment issues, he asserted, are for the Court, not the jury, and are then subject to de
novo review on appeal.
We are not sure that Bose holds that all First Amendment issues of fact are to be decided by the court instead of
the jury in cases otherwise triable to a jury under the Seventh Amendment. This is an action at law for damages,
a timely demand for jury trial was made, and a jury was properly empaneled. Certain issues of historical fact-for
example, whether Forbes was excluded from the debate because of hostility to his opinions--are certainly for the
jury, assuming that the evidence was in sufficient conflict to allow reasonable jurors to go either way. Thus, the
issues covered by the special interrogatories put to the jury in this case were correctly treated as jury issues, and we
do not understand defendants to argue otherwise.
By contrast, the question of what exactly the forum was in this case, whether it was a non-public forum or a
limited public forum, is a different sort of issue. It is a mixed question of law and fact, as to which the answer is
obtained by applying legal principles to facts. We do not understand the historical facts-for example, who set up
the debate, who was invited to attend, who was excluded, and the like--to be in dispute. If defendants, by citing
Bose, are asserting that such issues are never to be submitted to juries, we are not convinced. Bose has to do with
the reviewing or appellate function in First Amendment cases. It does not, at least not in so many words, address
the division of functions between judge and jury at the trial level.
In the present case, this distinction, between the division of functions at the trial level and the standard of review
at the appellate level, seems to us of no practical significance. Suppose the district court had allowed the issue of
how to characterize the forum to go to the jury, and suppose the jury had decided it one way or the other. The party
losing this issue would surely have filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, now called a motion
for judgment as a matter of law, and the district court would have ruled on the motion. In doing so, the district
court would have gone through the same mental process engaged in by appellate courts. It would have been
exercising essentially a reviewing function. And this Court, in turn, would have been bound to apply the Bose
approach on appeal.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Bose holds that appellate courts must "conduct an independent review of the
evidence on ... dispositive constitutional issue[s]" in First Amendment cases. Bose was a bench-tried case, but the
opinion clearly indicates that the same appellate standard applies in cases tried to juries:
... The rule of independent review assigns to judges a constitutional responsibility that cannot be
delegated to the trier of fact, whether the factfinding function be performed in the particular case
by a jury or by a trial judge.
In short, "First Amendment questions of 'constitutional fact' compel this Court's de novo review." Our recent
opinion in Families Achieving Independence and Respect v. Nebraska Department of Social Services, reaches the
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same conclusion: "[Where ... constitutional issues [in First Amendment cases] present mixed questions of law and
fact, our review is de novo."
We have a complete record before us on the public-forum question, and we have the holding of the District Court
on that issue. We now proceed to exercise our constitutional duty to conduct an independent review.
As an initial matter, we must determine whether the forum at issue is the television station, AETN, or the Third
District congressional debate. At oral argument and throughout its brief, AETN contends that the station is the
relevant forum. Forbes, on the other hand, contends that our analysis should focus on the debate.
The choice between the two forums suggested is not a difficult one. "In defining the forum we [ ] focus[ ] on the
access sought by the speaker." If the speaker seeks general access to public property, the forum encompasses that
property. But if only limited access is sought, we must take a "more tailored approach to ascertain[ ] the perimeters
of a forum within the confines of the government property." Forbes sought access to the debate alone. The debate
is a particular program among the numerous programs broadcast by AETN each day. Traditionally, when a speaker
"seek[s] access to a particular means of communication," it is that particularized forum which becomes the focus
of analysis. In keeping with that tradition, we conclude that the debate--the means of communication to which
Forbes seeks access--is the relevant forum in this case.
Having identified the forum, we now turn to the more difficult question of determining its character. Forbes
maintains that by staging the debate, AETN created a limited public forum. This type of forum has been defined
as a forum "created by government designation of a place or channel of communication for use by the public at
large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects." The Supreme
Court has recognized the existence of a limited public forum in a number of instances where the State "does not
itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead ... encourage[s] a diversity of views from
private speakers." Examples of limited public forums include university meeting facilities opened for use by
registered student groups, and municipal theaters open to theater productions.
A non-public forum, by contrast, is "[plublic property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public
communication...." A non-public forum is not necessarily transformed into a public or limited public forum even
though the State engages in a practice of "selective access," by "allow[ing] some organizations ... to use the
facilities."
There is no bright line or objective test for determining the character of the forum. We can say without
reservation, however, that the forum in this case, the debate, is a limited public forum. Just as the university in
Widmar created a limited public forum by opening its facilities to registered student groups for expressive speech,
AETN, by staging the debate, opened its facilities to a particular group--candidates running for the Third District
Congressional seat The debate may be readily distinguished from the forums at issue in Cornelius and Perry. In
Cornelius, it was clear that the CFC was not created "for purposes of providing a forum for expressive activity."
The expression made by giving money to charity was merely incidental to the purpose for which the forum was
opened-"to minimize the disruption to the workplace that had resulted from unlimited ad hoc solicitation activities
by lessening the amount of expressive activity occurring on federal property." Likewise, the forum in Perry, the
school's internal mail system, was designed solely for expression relating to school business. Access to the system
was granted to groups on an individual basis and was not "granted as a matter of course" to any particular group.
The debate staged by AETN,on the other hand, was staged in order for the candidates to express their views on
campaign issues.
The debate was surely a place opened by the government for a limited class of speakers. What was that class?
Was it all candidates for Congress legally qualified to appear on the ballot, or was it simply the Republican and
Democratic candidates? The latter answer, which essentially is the position espoused by defendants, is not
supportable either as a matter of law or logic. Surely government cannot, simply by its own ipse dixit, define a class
of speakers so as to exclude a person who would naturally be expected to be a member of the class on no basis other
than party affiliation. It must be emphasized that we are dealing here with political speech by legally qualified
candidates, a subject matter at the very core of the First Amendment, and that exclusion of one such speaker has
the effect of a prior restraint--it keeps his views from the public on the occasion in question.
The real issue, we think, is the legal sufficiency of the reason given for the exclusion. If AETN had considered
Mr. Forbes a viable candidate, it would, by its own account, have included him in the debate. There is nothing
about being a Democrat or a Republican, a priori, that is relevant here. Rather, AETN's point is that Mr. Forbes,
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in the opinion of the network, had no chance to win. It therefore decided that its viewers should not hear Mr.
Forbes's opinions as part of the debate involving the other candidates qualified to appear on the ballot.
We do not think that AETN's opinion on such a debatable matter as the political viability of a candidate for
Congress more than two months in advance of the election can be a sufficient basis for narrowing the channels of
public discourse. AETN itself characterizes the criteria it used as follows: "While these criteria can to some extent
be considered as objective, ultimately their use is essentially subjective." In a sense, the State of Arkansas had
already, by statute, defined political viability. Mr. Forbes had gathered enough signatures to appear on the ballot.
So far as the law was concerned, he had equal status with the Republican nominee and the Democratic nominee.
Whether he was viable was, ultimately, a judgment to be made by the people of the Third Congressional District,
not by officials of the government in charge of channels of communication.
We have no doubt that the decision as to political viability is exactly the kind of journalistic judgment routinely
made by newspeople. We also believe that the judgment in this case was made in good faith. But a crucial fact here
is that the people making this judgment were not ordinary journalists: they were employees of government. The
First Amendment exists to protect individuals, not government. The question of political viability is, indeed, so
subjective, so arguable, so susceptible of variation in individual opinion, as to provide no secure basis for the
exercise of governmental power consistent with the First Amendment. If Mr. Forbes can be excluded today, a
Republican or a Democrat who is believed to have no chance of success could be excluded tomorrow. It is worth
noting that Mr. Forbes himself received the most votes in the preferential primary for the Republican nomination
for Lieutenant Governor in 1990. (He was defeated in a run-off primary.) To give just one more example, in 1958,
in the Second Congressional District, a write-in candidate who equipped his supporters with stickers that could
readily be applied to the ballot defeated the incumbent Democratic Member of Congress, despite the fact that he
began his campaign very shortly before the election. Political viability is a tricky concept. We should leave it to
the voters at the polls, and to the professional judgment of nongovernmental journalists. A journalist employed
by the government is still a government employee.
In short, we hold that the reason given for excluding Mr. Forbes (and we accept at face value defendants'
proffered reason) was not legally sufficient under the First Amendment. It was neither compelling nor narrowly
tailored. Mr. Forbes is entitled to a judgment in his favor so declaring. The only issue remaining to be decided is
that of damages, whether nominal or compensatory.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. The District Court is instructed to enter judgment for the plaintiff Forbes and against the defendant
Arkansas Educational Television Commission, and, thereafter, to empanel a jury for the sole purpose of
determining the amount of actual damages sustained.
It is so ordered.
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96-1590 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION V. AKINS
Ruling below (CA DC (en banc), 101 F.3d 731, 65 LW 2389):
Federal Election Commission's interpretation of "political committee"subject to Federal
Election Campaign Act's disclosure requirements and contribution limits to include only
organizations that, in addition to making contributions or expenditures over $1,000 per year,
have as their major purpose campaign-related activity is void as inconsistent with plain terms
of statute; registered voters who filed complaint that was subsequently dismissed with FEC
claiming that American Israel Public Affairs Committee, which lobbies Congress and executive
branch for military and economic aid to Israel as well as disseminating campaign literature and
encouraging its supporters to aid particular candidates, is "political committee" subject to
relevant reporting and disclosure requirements and contribution and expenditure limits of
FECA, seek information needed to cast educated vote and thus have standing to sue for FEC
enforcement of FECA requirements.
Questions presented: (1) Is organization that spends more than $1,000 on contributions or
coordinated expenditures in calendar year, but is neither controlled by candidate nor has as its
major purpose nomination or election of candidates, "political committee" within meaning of
1971 Federal Election Campaign Act? (2) Did respondents have standing to bring this suit?
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COURT TO TAKE UP FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE RULES FOR LOBBYING GROUPS
The New York Times
Tuesday, June 17, 1997
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court agreed today to decide whether
organizations that lobby on behalf of causes but spend
only small portions of their budgets on political
contributions have to comply with the same broad
disclosure requirements that apply to ordinary political
committees, which spend most of their money on
campaigns.
At issue is the validity of the Federal Election
Commission's view that the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee -- a tax-exempt, 50,000-member
organization known as Aipac that lobbies on behalf of
Israel - need not disclose the sources of its $10 million
budget or the uses to which the money is put.
The Federal appeals court here ruled in December, in
a lawsuit brought by a group of politicians and former
diplomats who oppose United States support for Israel,
that the election commission lacked discretion under
Federal election law to exempt Aipac and similar
issue-oriented lobbies from the disclosure requirement.
The Clinton Administration appealed that ruling to the
Supreme Court on behalf of the election commission.
Like many cases growing out of the effort to control
money in politics, this case lies at an intersection
between free speech and Federal regulation. The
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 defines a
"political committee" as any organization that receives
or spends more than $1,000 in a year for the purpose
of "influencing any election for Federal office." Such
political committees are subject to a variety of
disclosure requirements.
The Federal Election Commission, however, has
taken the view that unless campaign spending is the
"major purpose" of the organization, the disclosure
requirements should not apply. The commission
derived its policy from several Supreme Court
decisions suggesting that without some limitation, the
statutory definition of "political committee" was so
broad and the disclosure requirements so onerous as to
impinge on the First Amendment rights of free speech
and association of the organizations' members.
Under the election commission's policy, an
organization that is neither controlled by a candidate
nor has as its "major purpose" the nomination or
election of candidates, is not a political committee.
While Aipac's expenditures were "likely to have
crossed the $1,000 threshold," the commission said, it
was "primarily and fundamentally a lobbying
organization" on United States relations with Israel,
and campaign expenditures "constitute only a small
portion of its overall activities."
The commission made that finding in response to a
complaint filed in 1989 by a group of former public
officials seeking disclosure of Aipac's finances. The
plaintiffs included Paul Findley, a onetime
Congressman from Illinois, and James E. Akins, a
former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, both vocal critics
of American support for Israel. Another plaintiff,
Richard Curtiss, a former United States Information
Agency official, called the appeals court's ruling
against the election commission "the beginning of the
end to the stranglehold that the Israeli lobby has on
U.S. Middle East policy."
Initially, the Federal District Court here and a
three-judge panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found the
election commission's policy valid. The full appeals
court ruled against the commission by a vote of 8 to 2.
The majority opinion said the commission's
interpretation would "wholly eviscerate" the definition
of a political committee by permitting organizations to
spend large amounts on campaign activity as long as
the amount was only a fraction of an even bigger
budget.
The two dissenting judges said the plaintiffs, as
private citizens claiming only a "generalized
grievance" against the commission, did not have
standing to bring their suit. That is an issue the
Supreme Court will have to resolve before it can
address the merits of the case, Federal Election
Commission v. Akins, No. 96-1590.
Copyright 1997, The New York Times Company
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GROUP'S POLITICAL GIVING TO GO BEFORE HIGH COURT
The Washington Times
Tuesday, June 17, 1997
Frank J. Murray
The Supreme Court agreed yesterday to clarify when
political committees must disclose campaign spending,
in a case originated by opponents of a major U.S.
lobbyist for Israel.
The Federal Election Commission asked the court to
exempt an organization from the $1,000 limit on
contributions if its major purpose is not running
political campaigns.
To do otherwise, U.S. Solicitor General Walter
Dellinger said, would burden organizations too much
for relatively minor involvement.
"The major purpose test . serves to ensure that
occasional election-related disbursements do not
subject an organization to the comprehensive
disclosure requirements" covering all income and
spending, Mr. Dellinger said in asking the court to
hear his appeal of a 9-2 decision by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
The justices' decision, expected sometime in 1998,
could provide important guidelines for spending under
the complex campaign-funding system now in place.
"AIPAC routinely has made undisclosed campaign
contributions" and exercises undue influence through
a cycle of lobbying and contributions that "is at the
root of that influence," said the plaintiffs' attorney,
Daniel M. Schember.
He said the appeals court ruling that ordered a
change in the way the FEC decides which groups must
disclose money spent to help individual candidates
could have a tremendous impact. Based on the ruling,
the FEC exempted the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee from disclosing campaign-related
spending.
A group of politically active people opposed to
AIPAC's views on U.S. policy in the Middle East filed
a complaint with the commission in 1989, accusing
AIPAC of violating the Federal Election Campaign
Act.
One of the complainants is Paul Findley, a former
congressman from Illinois who says AIPAC helped
defeat his re-election effort in 1982.
The plaintiffs argue that relaxing the rule guiding
contributions would provide a loophole through which
AIPAC, which has an annual budget of $10 million,
could continue making what the group feels are
improper campaign contributions.
"The FEC's test exempts organizations that flood
every election with millions of dollars of contributions,
provided they spend many more millions of dollars for
other purposes - such as lobbying for favors from the
officials whom the campaign contributions helped to
elect," Mr. Schember's brief said.
He said a group taking in $1 million a year and
contributing it all must report every transaction, but a
group that takes in $100 million and contributes $1
million need not because its "major purpose" is not
political.
"The amount matters. Whether the million dollars
has a potential to corrupt does not relate to how many
other millions the organization has," Mr. Schember
said yesterday.
"AIPAC welcomes the opportunity the Supreme
Court decision presents to reject those who would use
the judicial system to silence First Amendment speech
rather than face the court of public opinion, which has
already shown this country's commitment to strong
U.S.-Israel friendship," AIPAC spokeswoman Toby
Dershowitz said.
AIPAC General Counsel Phil Friedman played
down the case's importance, saying intervening
decisions and AIPAC's right to communicate with its
members will immunize it from FEC control in the end
no matter how the court rules.
"It doesn't make one iota to us as an organization,
because we're a membership organization. Whichever
way the Supreme Court goes on this, as an
organizational matter it doesn't mean anything to us,"
he said. "We don't make contributions at all.
Copyright (1997 The Washington Times
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James E. AKINS, et al., Appellants
V.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Appellee
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit
101 F.3d 731
Decided Dec. 6, 1996
As Amended Jan. 3, 1997.
SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge:
Appellants challenge the district court's grant of summary judgment. The court affirmed the Federal Election
Commission's dismissal of appellants' administrative complaint, which had alleged that the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee (AIPAC) was a "political committee" subject to relevant reporting and disclosure requirements
and contribution and expenditure limits of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). The court thought
reasonable the Commission's definition of "political committee" as including only organizations that, in addition
to meeting the statutory $1,000 expenditure threshold, have as their major purpose campaign related activity. We
reverse.
I.
James E. Akins, Richard Curtiss, Paul Findley, Robert J. Hanks, Andrew Killgore, and Orin Parker (collectively
appellants) are former ambassadors, congressmen, or government officials. They are registered voters and
"politically active persons who ... oppose AIPAC views on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East" and who "
compete with AIPAC in seeking to influence the views and actions of members of Congress, executive
policynakers, and the public." Paul Findley is a former congressman from Illinois "widely perceived to be friendly
to the Arab cause"; AIPAC is alleged to have helped to defeat him in the 1982 congressional election. AIPAC is
an incorporated, tax-exempt organization with approximately 50,000 supporters nationwide and a budget of about
$10 million (as of 1989) that lobbies Congress and the executive branch for military and economic aid to Israel and
generally encourages close relations with Israel.
Appellants filed a complaint with the FEC in 1989, alleging inter alia that AIPAC had made campaign
contributions and expenditures in excess of $1,000 and was therefore a political committee. A political committee
is defined as "any committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives contributions aggregating
in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during
a calendar year." "Expenditure" is defined in turn as "any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit,
or gift of money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election."
Expenditures have been classified by case law and FEC interpretation to include three categories: independent
expenditures not connected to any candidate, coordinated expenditures made in cooperation or consultation with
a candidate, and direct contributions to a candidate. Once designated a political committee, an organization must
file periodic reports disclosing all receipts and disbursements and identifying each individual to whom it gives or
from whom it receives more than $200. And it is prohibited from contributing more than $1,000 to any candidate.
Appellants claimed that AIPAC met the statutory definition of political committee because, for example, it used
full-time staff to meet with nearly every candidate for federal office, systematically disseminated campaign
literature including candidates' position papers, and conducted regular meetings and phone calls with AIPAC
supporters encouraging them to provide aid to particular candidates. Since these activities cost more than $1,000,
AIPAC's failure to register as a political committee and comply with the requirements was a violation of the Act.
The General Counsel investigated the allegations and issued a report in 1992, making recommendations that were
subsequently adopted by the Commission. The Commission determined that AIPAC likely had made campaign
contributions exceeding the $1,000 threshold, but concluded that there was not probable cause to believe AIPAC
was a political committee because its campaign-related activities were only a small portion of its overall activities
and not its major purpose. The campaign activities were only conducted in support of its lobbying activities. No
precedent was cited or rationale given, in the General Counsel's brief, his report, or the Commission's order, to
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support this interpretation of the statutory definition of "political committee." The Commission did find probable
cause to believe that AIPAC violated s 44 1b, which generally prohibits campaign expenditures and contributions
by corporations, but voted to take no action because it thought it was a close question whether AIPAC's
expenditures were made in the course of communicating with its members, an exception to s 44 lb's prohibition.
It therefore dismissed the complaint and closed the case.
Appellants sued in the district court pursuant to s 437g(a)(8), an unusual statutory provision which permits a
complainant to bring to federal court an agency's refusal to institute enforcement proceedings. The Commission
responded that the Supreme Court, concerned with the Act's burdens on political speech, had narrowed the term's
statutory definition in Buckley v. Valeo and FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life. The Commission read these
opinions-at least it so asserted in district court--as holding that an organization is a political committee only if its
major purpose is the influencing of federal elections. Therefore, notwithstanding the plain language, the
Commission claimed it interpreted the statute at least reasonably.
The district court agreed. A divided panel of this court affirmed. The FEC had not originally challenged
appellants' standing, but the panel sua sponte asked the parties to brief the issue. The panel majority concluded
that appellants had suffered an "informational injury" as voters and members of the public; the lack of information
on AIPAC's contributions and expenditures, caused by the FEC's action, limited the information available to them
as voters and impaired their ability to influence and inform the public and policymakers. The dissent thought
appellants' injury was based instead on their competitive lobbying position vis-a-vis AIPAC. We determined to
rehear the case en banc and directed the parties to focus on standing as well as the merits.
II.
The Commission, as it did before the panel (after it was asked to address standing), challenges the court's
jurisdiction. The Commission contends that neither the theories adopted by the panel judges nor appellants'
somewhat different contentions satisfy Article III standing requirements. Appellants--whether as voters or political
competitors (except for Findley whose standing as a candidate the Commission does not challenge --not only lack
injury-in-fact, their alleged injury was not caused by the Commission's actions and it is not redressable by this
court's order. It is further argued that even if appellants make out Article III standing, they are not parties
"aggrieved" under the statute and so lack prudential standing.
We take up first appellants' standing as voters. We have recognized in our "informational standing" cases that
a party may be entitled to sue in federal court to force the government to provide information to the public (and
thereby to it) if the government's failure to provide or cause others to provide that particular information specially
affects that party. But this type of injury is narrowly defined; the failure must impinge on the plaintiffs daily
operations or make normal operations infeasible in order to create injury-in-fact.
Although Congress may not "create" an Article II injury that the federal judiciary would not recognize, anymore
than Congress could amend the Constitution, such a legal right can be given to all persons in the country. In that
event, any person whose individual right has been frustrated or interfered with has standing to sue, even though
all other persons have the same right, without the claim being regarded as a generalized grievance. That is why
anyone denied information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) has standing to sue regardless of his or
her reasons for suing.
Appellants would analogize this case to a FOLA case; any and all voters, in their view, suffer injury-in-fact when
the FEC fails to force a political committee to report its activities to the Commission, which then has an obligation
under the statute to make such information available to the public. But Congress did not quite create a legal right
in all individual voters to obtain that information either directly or indirectly. The mere denial of an attempt to
gain information does not create a cognizable injury under the Act. An individual must file a complaint with the
Commission, which is provided authority to enforce the requirement that political committees report their activities.
Only parties aggrieved by the dismissal of a complaint are entitled to challenge in court the Commission's refusal
to enforce. (Although under s 437g(a)(8)(C), if a court decision directing the Commission to act is ignored by the
FEC, the complainant can actually sue the offending party directly.) This indicates that the statutory entitlement
to information is not as categorical or direct as that of FOIA.
While a voter's rights under the Act are not exactly analogous to FOIA, appellants do have a point, and it is a
point that distinguishes this case somewhat from our informational standing cases. Congress clearly intended
voters to have access to the information political committees were obliged to report. The whole theory of the statute
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is that voters are benefitted insofar as they can determine who is contributing what to whom. Although Congress
cannot determine when someone has suffered Article III injury, we do not think it can be denied that this sort of
information that Congress required disclosed aids voters, if and when they vote. If a party is denied information
that will help it in making a transaction--and a vote can be thought of as a kind of transaction--that party is
obviously injured in fact. We recognized as much in Public Citizen, where we determined that a group representing
consumers had standing to challenge the FTC's regulations exempting from health warnings certain promotional
items sold by manufacturers of smokeless tobacco. Those promotional items, a form of advertising, were designed
to encourage the purchase of smokeless tobacco, and some of the plaintiffs' members and their families alleged that
they used or may use those products without the statutorily required reminder of the dangers that consumption
entails. We reasoned that such information would be of substantial value to the plaintiffs' members, and therefore
they were injured because they were deprived of it at the time they purchased or used the product.
Although admittedly registered voters--even the more limited subset of those who actually vote--is a very large
group of Americans, we do not think it analytically sound to describe a lawsuit brought by affected registered voters
as presenting only a generalized grievance. The term "generalized grievance" does not just refer to the number of
persons who are allegedly injured; it refers to the diffuse and abstract nature of the injury. The number of potential
plaintiffs matters not so long as each can assert a distinct, individual injury. A voter deprived of useful information
at the time he or she votes suffers a particularized injury in some respects unique to him or herself just as a
government contractor, allegedly wrongfully deprived of information to be made available at the time bids are due,
would suffer a particularized injury even if all other bidders also suffered an injury. As we understand our
dissenting colleagues, they agree with the Commission that appellants are presenting a generalized grievance
because it is information that they seek. Apparently if Congress provided that public or private employers were
obliged to provide their employees free transportation to the polls, enforceable through an agency like the FEC, that
would be a particularized right (except that according to Section B of their opinion it would not be redressable).
We think the dissent is just incorrect in refusing to see information as a commodity of value.
To be sure, it would not be enough for standing in this case for appellants to assert only that they were voters, for
appellants would not be injured as voters if AIPAC's activities were unrelated to any election in which they voted.
But appellants can hardly be expected to allege that AIPAC made contributions in the elections in which they voted,
for whether AIPAC made such contributions is precisely the information of which appellants claim they have been
deprived. As the FEC found that AIPAC likely did contribute in excess of $1,000 in one year, and the FEC did not
identify the elections to which these contributions were made, there is nothing to indicate that appellants did not
vote in various federal elections in which AIPAC allegedly made contributions that qualified it as a political
committee. Therefore we conclude that appellants have standing as affected voters. We thus need not resolve
whether appellants also have standing as political competitors of AIPAC, or whether Mr. Findley--who was last
a candidate in 1982 --has standing as a candidate.
The Commission also questions the causal connection between its decision and appellants' injury, as well as
causation's corollary in standing analysis-- redressability. As best we understand the FEC's rather confusing
argument, its causation objection is primarily directed to appellants' alleged lobbying injury rather than their injury
as voters. That the Commission does not make the argument vis-a-vis appellants' standing as voters is
understandable because such a theory would stretch causation to its breaking point; no one would have standing
to challenge the Commission's determination, or for that matter, many other administrative agency actions. It is
only necessary for a voter to allege that his vote and others' votes may have been affected by the disclosure of
information that a contrary FEC determination would have made available.
The Commission's argument that appellants lack standing because we cannot issue an order that redresses their
injury-with which the dissent agrees- strikes us as a breathtaking attack on the legitimacy of virtually all judicial
review of agency action. The Commission points out that it has enforcement discretion, so that even if we were
to determine that its statutory interpretation of "political committee" is erroneous, it does not follow that AIPAC
would be required to disclose the information a political committee must; the FEC might settle with AIPAC on
terms that did not require disclosure. Yet all regulatory agencies enjoy some measure of enforcement discretion.
If that factor were to mean that an agency's legal determination was not reviewable, that would virtually end judicial
review of agency action. We rarely know when we entertain a case, say, challenging an agency's interpretation of
a statute, whether the agency's ultimate action will be favorable to the petitioner or appellant. Our job is limited
to correcting a legal error--if error is committed--in the agency decision. The error must, of course, be one upon
which the agency decision rests, an analytical precondition to the agency action. If that is so, it has always been
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an acceptable feature of judicial review of agency action that a petitioner's "injury" is redressed by the reviewing
court notwithstanding that the agency might well subsequently legitimately decide to reach the same result through
different reasoning.
Nor can it be relevant, as the dissent supposes, that AIPAC might not comply with the Commission's order. That
too is always true when an agency's nonaction against a third party is challenged. In any event, under this very
unusual statute appellants are not dependent on the Commission's compliance with our decision correcting the
Commission's interpretation of the phrase "political committee." As we noted earlier, if the Commission fails to
"conform" to our "declaration," the appellants, as the original complainant, may bring their own civil action to
remedy the violation of law. It would appear under this provision that if the Commission gave only lip service to
compliance with our order and settled with AIPAC without requiring disclosure, as the dissent suggests could
occur, appellants would be able to seek disclosure directly. This unique statutory provision then completely
undermines the Commission's and the dissent's redressability argument--even on the argument's own terms.
Finally, the Commission challenges appellants' prudential standing, claiming they are not parties aggrieved
within the meaning of the statute, which provides that "any party aggrieved by an order of the Commission
dismissing a complaint filed by such party ... may file a petition with the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia." The Supreme Court, interpreting similar language in the Administrative Procedure Act
permitting judicial review generally if a party is "aggrieved," has held that term obliges federal courts to determine
whether, under the substantive statute, the party seeking judicial review is within the zone of interests. Thus [iun
cases where the plaintiff is not itself the subject of the contested regulatory action, the test denies a right of review
if the plaintiffs interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that
it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit. The test is not meant to be especially
demanding; in particular, there need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff.
Here, although the governing judicial review provision is included within the substantive statute, the same test
logically should apply to determine whether a party challenging a Commission decision qualifies. But why would
appellants not meet that test? The Commission's argument again is rather convoluted. It concedes, as it surely
must, that the statute is designed primarily to aid voters; therefore, it seems strange to even suggest that a voter
would not have prudential standing. Yet the Commission asserts that "a pure voter's interest [is] too generalized
to satisfy Article III or the zone of interests test". We have already explained why we do not regard appellants' case
as presenting a "generalized grievance." And although the numbers of persons who might be eligible to sue might
well bear on a determination as to whether Congress intended such a broad class of potential litigants, in this case
it is apparent that Congress treated the broad class--voters--as the core beneficiaries of the statute. Therefore, we
simply cannot glean any congressional intent to preclude members of that class from suing--so long as they filed
a complaint with the FEC that was dismissed.
The Commission contends that "aggrieved" must be read to require a more direct connection to or a greater stake
in the conduct in question, call it "voter plus" status. But appellants are not merely voters; they are voters who
have filed a complaint with the Commission that has been dismissed. In sum, appellants' interests as voters clearly
are not "so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute," for it to be unreasonable
to assume Congress intended to permit them to sue.
III.
Section 431(4)(A) defines "political committee" solely in terms of "expenditures" and "contributions": a political
committee is "any committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives contributions aggregating
in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during
a calendar year." The FEC concedes that this language sets unambiguous requirements for classification as a
political committee. But it asserts that Supreme Court decisions have narrowed the reach of the statutory language
in response to First Amendment concerns. The FEC relies on language in Buckley, in claiming that an
organization should only be classified as a political committee if, in addition to exceeding the $1,000 expenditure
limit, the organization's major purpose is the nomination or election of a candidate or the organization is controlled
by a political candidate.
At minimum, the Commission argues, these cases created an ambiguity in the statutory definition of "political
committee" so that the Commission's subsequent interpretation of the term is owed deference--and passes muster.
When Congress is silent or ambiguous, the Commission reminds us, an agency's construction is owed deference
211
if it is permissible. That the ambiguity here arose from Supreme Court interpretation does not, it is argued, affect
this general rule of deference; the agency still has discretion to fill the interpretive "gap." According to the FEC,
the gap to be addressed here is not whether the Court established a major purpose test as a generic definition of
political committee (which the Commission assumes), but how such a test is to be implemented. Since the Court
did not decide the types of organizations that are within its "definition" of political committee, whether
contributions and expenditures are treated the same, and so on, the Commission has discretion to flesh out the
concept, consistent with Supreme Court precedent.
We think the FEC's plea for deference is doctrinally misconceived. It is undisputed that the statutory language
is not in issue, but only the limitation-or really the extent of the limitation--put on this language by Supreme Court
decisions. We are not obliged to defer to an agency's interpretation of Supreme Court precedent. The
Commission's assertion that Congress and the Court are equivalent in this respect is inconsistent with Chevron's
basic premise. Chevron recognized that Congress delegates policymaking functions to agencies, so deference by
the courts to agencies' statutory interpretations of ambiguous language is appropriate. But the Supreme Court does
not, of course, have a similar relationship to agencies, and agencies have no special qualifications of legitimacy in
interpreting Court opinions. There is therefore no reason for courts--the supposed experts in analyzing judicial
decisions--to defer to agency interpretations of the Court's opinions. This is especially true where, as here, the
Supreme Court precedent is based on constitutional concerns, which is an area of presumed judicial competence.
In sum, since it is not, and cannot be, contended that the statutory language itself is ambiguous, and the asserted
"ambiguity" only arises because of the Supreme Court's narrowing opinions, we must decide de novo the precise
impact of those opinions. In that regard, we think the Commission misstates the interpretation issue. As we noted,it casts the question as how the major purpose test applies, as if the test were set forth categorically. But as we see
the key question, it is whether the Supreme Court's major purpose limitation imposed in certain circumstances for
constitutional reasons applies in another circumstance--this case--in which the same constitutional concerns may
not be implicated.
Turning to the Supreme Court's decisions, the Court did state in Buckley that the term political committee "need
only encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the
nomination or election of a candidate." And this notion was repeated in MCFL: "an entity subject to regulation
as a 'political committee' under the Act is one that is either 'under the control of a candidate or the major purpose
of which is the nomination or election of a candidate.' " Although MCFL apparently was not charged with
violating the political committee provisions, the Court in dicta said that "should MCFL's independent spending
become so extensive that the organization's major purpose may be regarded as campaign activity, the corporation
would be classified as a political committee."
While the above language in Buckley and MCFL can literally be read to support the FEC's position, both cases
focused on the constitutional concerns raised by independent expenditures, which are not coordinated with or madein consultation with any candidate, as distinguished from coordinated expenditures or direct contributions.Independent expenditures are the most protected form of political speech because they are closest to pure issuediscussion and therefore farthest removed from the valid goal of preventing election corruption. They raise more
serious First Amendment concerns because it is difficult to determine when an expenditure is independent, and
regulation therefore risks chilling protected speech. For that reason, in Buckley the Supreme Court determined that
expenditure limits are more likely to violate the First Amendment because they place substantial and direct
restrictions on the ability to engage in political speech. Limitations on contributions or coordinated expenditures,on the other hand, were thought to raise fewer constitutional concerns because they serve the basic governmentalinterest of protecting the electoral process while only marginally restricting political debate and discussion.
To support its interpretation, the FEC points to Buckley's discussion of s 434(e), which imposes disclosure
requirements on "[e]very person (other than a political committee or candidate)" making contributions or
expenditures exceeding $100. "Contributions"--when defined as direct or indirect contributions to a candidate,political party, or campaign committee, or expenditures placed with the cooperation or consent of a candidate--weredetermined to "have a sufficiently close relationship to the goals of the Act," and therefore limits on them are
constitutional. The Court noted that the meaning of "expenditure," however, posed line- drawing difficultiesbecause it posed the danger of "encompassing both issue discussion and advocacy of a political result." Therefore,the reach of s 434(e) was limited by "constru[ing] 'expenditure' for purposes of that section ... to reach only funds
used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." In the
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midst of this analysis of the scope of "expenditures" under s 434(e), the Court noted in dicta that the meaning of
political committee, because it was defined solely in terms of contributions and expenditures, posed the same
line-drawing problem. The Court's language that apparently refers to the major purpose of an organization, given
this context, does not really support the Commission's interpretation:
To fulfill the purposes of [FECA, political committees] need only encompass organizations that are
under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a
candidate. Expenditures of candidates and of "political committees" so construed can be assumed
to fall within the core area sought to be addressed by Congress. They are, by definition, campaign
related.
We think the better interpretation of this language, as appellants suggest, is that when an organization controlled
by a candidate or the major purpose of which is election-related makes disbursements, those disbursements will
presumptively be expenditures within the statutory definition. The Court clearly distinguished independent
expenditures and contributions as to their constitutional significance, and its references to a "major purpose" test
seem to implicate only the former.
As we noted, certain language in MCFL can also be read to support the FEC's position, but the Court was again
addressing First Amendment problems with the regulation of independent expenditures. The Court held that s
441b, which prohibits corporate contributions or expenditures "in connection with any election," was
unconstitutional as applied to MCFL because the Act's reporting and disclosure requirements might discourage
protected political speech of such advocacy groups. Still, the Court's analysis clearly distinguished contributions
and expenditures: "should MCFL's independent spending become so extensive that the organization's major
purpose may be regarded as campaign activity, the corporation would be classified as a political committee." As
in Buckley, this language can be read as merely creating a presumption that certain organizations' expenditures
are "made ... for the purpose of influencing any election"; an organization devoted almost entirely to campaign
spending could not plead that the administrative burdens associated with such spending were unconstitutional as
applied to it. As in Buckley, the underlying concern is that congressional regulation, in its effort to achieve full
disclosure, may impermissibly discourage protected independent expenditures. In short, the Court's rationale in
MCFL and Buckley is simply inapplicable to the present case. There is no constitutional problem with applying
s 431(4)(A) to AIPAC or to other organizations making campaign contributions (or coordinated expenditures)
exceeding the statutory limits.
The FEC further contends, however, that we endorsed its "major purpose" test in Machinists Non-Partisan
Political League. In Machinists, we held that "draft groups" that promoted the acceptance of particular individuals
prior to their actual nomination did not fall within the definition of "political committee" because the expenditures
and contributions were not made to a "candidate." Our decision was based in large part on Congress' intent to
exclude draft groups from the definition of political committee. And our analysis, contrary to the FEC's suggestion,
supports appellants' interpretation of the major purpose test. We did quote Buckley's language--noted above to be
equivocal--on an organization's major purpose. But we concluded that Buckley had endorsed the " narrowing
construction" of "political committee" developed in United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment and
American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Jennings, and we noted that "[a]ll three of these decisions recognized the
grave constitutional difficulties inherent in construing the term 'political committee' to include groups whose
activities are not under the control of a 'candidate,' or directly related to promoting or defeating a clearly identified
'candidate' for federal office." Our use of the word "activities"- while admittedly not free from ambiguity--indicates
that, as appellants contend, it is the purpose of the organization's disbursements, not of the organization itself, that
is relevant.
The FEC's interpretation of "political committee" would, as appellants point out, allow a large organization to
contribute substantial sums to campaign activity, as long as the contributions are a small portion of the
organization's overall budget, without being subject to the limitations and requirements imposed on political
committees. Thus, an organization spending its entire $1 million budget on campaign activity would be a political
committee, while another organization spending $1 million of its $100 million budget on campaign activity would
not This would wholly eviscerate the $1,000 limit in s 431(4)(A)'s definition of "political committee." That such
an organization, as the Commission emphasizes, may be limited by other statutory provisions as well-e.g., s 44 lb's
prohibition on corporate expenditures and s 434(c)'s restrictions on persons (defined in s 431(11) to include
corporations) making independent election expenditures--is irrelevant. There is no indication that Congress
213
intended to limit one section in light of others or to make their application mutually exclusive. As the Commission
concedes, various statutory provisions impose different, if overlapping, limits and requirements on organizations;
these differences represent the sound exercise of congressional judgment as to the various degrees of risk to the
election process posed by certain activities.
The Commission seeks to minimize the implications of its interpretation by arguing that it has not yet resolved
when an organization's spending becomes "a" major purpose that counts toward the "political committee"
threshold. But we think little of this suggested safety valve; the inevitable logic of the Commission's test is that
the two organizations described above, spending precisely the same amount to influence federal elections and
therefore presenting precisely the same threat of election corruption, will be treated differently. And if the
Commission is truly considering a variable major purpose standard as applied to contributions--now it applies and
now it does not--such discretion in itself raises First Amendment concerns. Moreover, if it relied on such a
standard, the Commission should have determined more precisely the level of AIPAC's campaign spending and
should have explained why that funding was not "a" major purpose.
There is no contention that AIPAC's disbursements were independent expenditures, so there is no constitutionalbarrier to application of s 431(4)(A)'s plain terms. The FEC found that AIPAC likely made campaign contributionsin excess of $1,000. Its decision that no probable cause existed to believe AIPAC was a political committee, andits consequent dismissal of appellants' complaint, were therefore based on its mistaken interpretation of s431(4)(A). This error requires that we reverse the dismissal of the complaint and remand to the FEC for further
action not inconsistent with this opinion.
The judgment of the district court is
Reversed.
SENTELLE, Circuit Judge, dissenting: [OMITTED]
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96-670 FOSTER V. LOVE
Ruling below (CA 5, 90 F.3d 1026, 65 LW 2128):
Louisiana open primary system that permits contested congressional elections to be
decided prior to uniform federal election day prescribed by 2 USC 1 and 7 is preempted
by federal law.
Questions presented: (1) Does election system employed by Louisiana to elect its
members to U.S. Congress conflict with federal laws governing time for holding
congressional elections so as to render Louisiana's manner of conducting its
congressional elections unenforceable under Supremacy Clause? (2) Does decision of
Fifth Circuit constitute unnecessary and unwarranted abrogation of authority specifically
granted to states by Article I, Section 4, clause 1 of U.S. Constitution to provide for
manner of electing members to Congress?
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COURT RULES LA. PRIMARY VIOLATES LAW
FEDERAL JUDGES OK SEPT. 21 ELECTIONS
The Baton Rouge Advocate
Wednesday, July 31, 1996
Joe Gyan Jr.
NEW ORLEANS - Louisiana's unique open primary
system violates federal laws aimed at having all 50
states elect members of Congress on the same federal
election day, a divided federal appellate court panel
ruled Tuesday.
But the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals panel
stopped short of blocking the state's Sept. 21
congressional elections, saying such a move would be
too costly to candidates and the state and too confusing
for voters.
The 2-1 decision, which applied only to congressional
elections, did not specify whether the state has to go
back to a two-party primary system, which was in place
prior to 1978.
The judges instead sent the case back to U.S. District
Judge Frank Polozola, and gave the state a "reasonable
time" after the May 1997 regular legislative session to
deal with the problem before Polozola should block the
open primary law.
State Attorney General Richard leyoub, himself a
candidate for the U.S. Senate seat being vacated by the
retiring J. Bennett Johnston, said the 5th Circuit ruling
"would greatly affect the way Louisiana conducts its
congressional elections."
"We are currently studying the ruling and its future
impact," he said in a written statement. "Although the
decision doesn't change this fall's primary, we will be
meeting with the Governor's Office and members of the
Legislature in the coming weeks to discuss what action
to take in this case."
Gov. Murphy J. "Mike" Foster said he prefers the open
primary system to the closed, party primary system and
will fight to hang onto the present open system.
"It's very simple," he said. "I think the public likes it
too. It's quick and doesn't get dragged out. I wouldn't
have been governor if it hadn't been for it."
The governor said the state could end up with two
election systems - a closed primary system for federal
elections and an open primary system for state and local
elections.
"The feds have a way of making messes of things, so
it is quite possible that would happen," he said. "I don't
think we ought to do anything at the state level just
because the feds want you to."
Four Baton Rouge voters had asked the 5th Circuit
earlier this month to force the state to hold Democratic
and Republican primaries for congressional seats
instead of the open primary system.
Polozola had dismissed their suit in the spring, saying
the state election law did not violate federal law.
Baton Rouge lawyer Daniel Balhoff, who represents
the four voters, said he will decide in the next few days
whether to ask the 51h Circuit panel or the entire appeals
court to reconsider blocking the Sept. 21 open primary.
Balhoff said he also has the option of asking the U.S.
Supreme Court to halt the primary election.
Under Louisiana's current open primary system, all
candidates run on the same ballot. Anyone who gets a
majority is declared the winner. If no one gets a
majority, the top two vote-getters square off in a runoff.
In contrast, a party primary system allows only
members of a party to run in the party's primary
election. The winners of those primaries meet in the
general election.
Attorneys for the four Baton Rouge voters told the 5th
Circuit panel earlier this month that the state's open
primary system conflicts with federal law setting a
national election date.
Circuit Judge W. Eugene Davis and federal Judge
Eldon Fallon of New Orleans, who was sitting by
special appointment, concurred, saying a race should
not be decided in the open primary - which is held at
least one month before the general election.
"The Louisiana election system, as applied to elections
for congressmen, conflicts with the federal statutes that
establish a uniform federal election day and thwarts the
congressional purpose of establishing a uniform day to
prevent earlier elections from influencing later voters,"
Davis wrote for the majority.
Davis said that since 1978 more than 80 percent of
contested congressional elections in Louisiana have
been decided in the primary. Only nine of 57 elections
for U.S. representatives and one of six elections for U.S.
senators had candidates placed on the November
general election ballot, he said.
Circuit Judge James Dennis, a former Louisiana
Supreme Court justice who joined the 5th Circuit earlier
this year, said in a dissenting opinion that it is wrong to
throw out the open primary law simply because it
produces winners before the general election.
"It would be a simple matter for this court to enjoin
such a declaration that a congressional candidate is
elected until the federal election day, rather than
declaring the whole law unconstitutional in its
application to Congressional elections," he wrote.
Dennis added that Louisiana's old party primary
system often produced winners before federal election
day.
Copyright 1996 by Capital City Press
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COURT TO HEAR PRIMARY APPEAL
LA.'S RIGHT TO SET ELECTIONS AT ISSUE
The New Orleans Times-Picayune
Tuesday, March 18, 1997
Ed Anderson and Jack Wardlaw, Capital Bureau
State officials Monday hailed a U.S. Supreme Court
decision to reconsider the legality of Louisiana's unique
open primary election law, but legal scholars said the
state still has an uphill battle.
The 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has ordered the
state to change its system for federal elections because
congressional races often are decided in an October
primary instead of on Election Day in November as
required by federal law.
Louisiana appealed, contending that the ruling
violated the state's authority to decide how to hold
elections, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the
appeal on that basis.
Gov. Foster called the ruling "good news" and said he
hoped the court would leave the open primary system
intact.
Attorney General Richard Ieyoub said the case is "of
extreme importance to the issue of states' rights. Under
our federal Constitution, each state is authorized to
determine how it elects congressmen."
He said if Louisiana is forced to change its system,
"the state's sovereignty will be adversely affected."
But the Rev. Lawrence Moore, S.J., a professor of
federal and constitutional law at Loyola University
School of Law in New Orleans, said he is puzzled why
the high court kept the case alive for review given the
clear-cut 5th Circuit ruling that the state and federal
laws are in conflict.
"This may possibly give an extra hammer to the
decision of the 5th Circuit, saying you have to change,"
he said. "It may be the exclamation point to that ruling,
telling the state it has to change."
Louisiana State University Law Center professor Jay
Bybee said any time a state's election system is
challenged it will raise the eyebrows of the court. "It is
an important issue any time a federal court is in the
process of disapproving an entire election system of a
state."
The merits of the case might not be argued until the
fall or winter, into the next term of the court, said Baton
Rouge attorney Daniel Balhoff, who represents the four
Baton Rouge area voters who filed suit against the
system in 1995.
Starting in 1978, Louisiana began choosing members
of Congress through open primaries, which put all
candidates on the same primary ballot regardless of
political party. If no primary candidate gets more than
half the totai votes, the top two vote-getters go on the
November ballot. But a candidate who does get more
than half of the vote is declared the winner and there is
no vote for that congressional seat in November.
Since 1978, more than 80 percent of Louisiana's
contested congressional elections have been decided in
the primary.
The lawsuit claims the federal law supersedes state
laws, but the state says it has the right to set its own
election procedures.
The 5th Circuit, in a 2-1 decision last year, stopped
short of canceling the 1996 congressional elections and
did not order a return to two-party primary elections as
requested by the plaintiffs. The court concluded that
such a switch, less than two months from the primary,
would be confusing to voters and expensive for the state.
The judges said the Legislature should get a chance to
redesign the state's congressional elections before the
courts intervene.
But with the case pending before the Supreme Court,
state lawmakers might be less motivated to act in the
legislative session that begins March 31.
Rep. Peppi Bruneau, R-New Orleans, one of
staunchest defenders of the open primary system, said
the high court's decision "looks like a big plus for the
state's case."
Bruneau, the House's second-ranking official, said he
plans to meet with the chairmen of the House and
Senate Governmental Affairs committees and the
attorney general's office before the session to plot a
course of action.
"It's always hard to predict what the Supreme Court
will do," Bruneau said. "But it may be that they will
reject the lower court decision and leave our election
law alone."
If that seems likely, he said, the best plan may be for
the Legislature to do nothing and wait for the court to
rule early in 1998. "If we pass a new law, it will moot
the case and the plaintiffs can come back with a new
lawsuit," he said.
The danger, he said, is that the court will rule against
the Louisiana law in early 1998 with qualifying for the
fall congressional races just months away.
The New Orleans Times-Picayune, Copyright 1997
217
G. Scott LOVE, et. al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
Michael J. FOSTER, et. al., Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
90 F.3d 1026
July 30, 1996
W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
Appellants, four Louisiana voters, appeal from the district court's order granting defendants' motion for summary
judgment and dismissing plaintiffs' suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on grounds that Louisiana's
method of conducting congressional elections violates the Constitution and laws of the United States. We reverse.
I.
In August 1995 four Louisiana citizens, who are registered to vote in Louisiana and who have a history of voting
in congressional elections, filed this action for declaratory and injunctive relief. They seek this relief under 42
U.S.C.s 1983 and pursuant to our federal question jurisdiction to resolve a Constitutional claim. Their core
allegation is that the Louisiana open primary system violates the federal statutes that establish a uniform federal
election day for members of Congress and must yield under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. After
cross-motions for summary judgment were filed, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
The appellants filed a timely appeal.
II.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. In deciding this appeal, we address only the
pre-emption claim.
In Louisiana Public Service Comm. v. FCC, the Supreme Court summarized the theories under which state laws
are pre-empted as follows:
Pre-emption occurs when Congress, in enacting a federal statute, expresses a clear intent to pre-empt
state law, when there is outright or actual conflict between federal and state law, where compliance
with both federal and state law is in effect physically impossible, where there is implicit in federal
law a barrier to state regulation, where Congress has legislated comprehensively, thus occupying
an entire field of regulation and leaving no room for the States to supplement federal law, or where
the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of
Congress. Pre-emption may result not only from action taken by Congress itself, a federal agency
acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation.
We start our pre-emption analysis from the bedrock premise that Congress has authority to enact the requirements
for federal elections. Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the Constitution states:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make
or alter such Regulations, except as the Places of choosing Senators.
In Smiley v. Holm, the Court, interpreting Art. I, s 4, Cl. 1, stated that "[iut cannot be doubted that these
comprehensive words embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times
and places, but in relation to notices, registration...."
In 1872, Congress established a uniform election day for elections for U.S. Representatives by enacting 2 U.S.C.
s 7, which states:
The Tuesday next after the Ist Monday in November, in every even numbered year, is established
as the day for the election, in each of the States and Territories of the United States, of
Representatives and Delegates to the Congress commencing on the 3d day of January next
thereafter.
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This same election day was later adopted for elections for U.S. Senators in 2 U.S.C. s 1:
At the regular election held in any State next preceding the expiration of the term for which any
Senator was elected to represent such State in Congress, at which election a Representative to
Congress is regularly by law to be chosen, a United States Senator from said state shall be elected
by the people thereof for the term commencing on the 3d day of January next thereafter.
Congress also set this day for the election of presidential electors. Congress in 2 U.S.C. ss 1, 7 therefore declared
that all elections for Congress should be held on the same date, the Tuesday following the first Monday in
November (federal election day). This declaration was subject to only two exceptions: (1) in states that required
a majority vote for election, a runoff could be held between federal election day and January when officials take
office; and (2) an election could be held on a different date if a vacancy occurred in the office. In adopting this
scheme, Congress precluded a state from holding an election in which members of Congress could be elected before
the federal election date.
This interpretation is supported by the legislative history. This history indicates that Congress wanted a uniform
election day to prevent earlier elections in some states unduly influencing the later voters, to prevent fraudulent
voting in multiple state elections, and to remove the burden of voting in more than one federal election in a given
year.
The legislative history of 2 U.S.C. s 8 also supports the conclusion that Congress intended any outcome
determinative election to be held on federal election day unless it fell within the exception in s 8 During the
consideration of s 8, Senator Thurman explained that Section 8
relates only to the case of a special election to fill a vacancy, or where there is a failure to elect. It
does not touch the general elections for members of the House of Representatives. The cases,
therefore, to which it will apply are very rare indeed. It is very seldom that there is an election to
fill a vacancy, and still more seldom that there is a failure to elect. In all those States in which a
plurality elects, no such thing as failure to elect can occur unless there should be a tie, and in those
cases I think in every State the right then is determined by lot....
I think, therefore, there can be no failure to elect except in those States in which a majority of all the
votes is necessary to elect a member, and they are very few in number. Then there is no probability
of there being a failure to elect so as to make this section necessary in many cases, and the vacancies
that happen are very few indeed. The section itself, therefore, is rather inserted out of abundant
caution than for any other reason.
For all of the above reasons, we conclude that Congress intended that all determinative federal elections be held
on federal election day except for the rare exceptions specified in 2 U.S.C. s 8.
We turn next to the Louisiana election scheme which appellants contend conflicts with 2 U.S.C. ss 1, 7. Before
1978, Louisiana's election system for selection of representatives and senators complied with the federal election
day statutes. The pre-1978 Louisiana law required recognized political parties to nominate candidates through
partisan primaries. The parties' nominees for Congress would then appear on the ballot on federal election day.
Independent candidates and others who wished to appear on the federal election day ballot with the party nominees
were required to qualify by other methods. The names of all qualified candidates were placed on the federal
election day ballot. The candidate who received the most votes in this election was declared the winner.
In 1978, Louisiana drastically changed its method for selecting federal and state officials by adopting an open
primary system. Under this system, all candidates, regardless of party affiliation, appear on the same ballot and
all voters regardless of party affiliation may vote for the candidate of their choice.
This open primary is ordinarily held "on the first Saturday in October next preceding the date of the general
election." To win in the October primary, a candidate must receive a majority of the votes cast. Louisiana holds
its general election on the federal election day. But the names of congressional candidates (like candidates for
statewide office) only appear on the general election ballot if no single candidate receives a majority of the votes
in the primary and a runoff between the two top candidates is required.
Thus the Louisiana open primary system allows contested elections for Congress to be decided in the primary,
which is held at least one month before the general election. This is the portion of the Louisiana election scheme
that appellants contend is in conflict with 2 U.S.C. ss 1, 7. The Louisiana election code provides that: "A
candidate who receives a majority of the votes cast for an office in a primary election is elected." When the seat
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in Congress is filled in the October primary, no candidate's name appears on the ballot in the November general
election and no vote for that office can be cast on the federal election date. In fact, since 1978 over 80% of the
contested congressional elections have been decided in the October primary. Only nine of fifty-seven contested
elections for U.S. Representatives and one of six contested elections for U.S. Senator had candidates placed on the
general election ballot for November.
Appellants argue that the 2 U.S.C. ss 1, 7 sets the earliest day that a state may hold a contested election for
Congress where the winner may be determined. Appellants contend that the Louisiana election system conflicts
with this provision by allowing such an election at an earlier date.
Appellees assert that the purpose of the primary election is to qualify candidates to appear on the November
ballot. They argue that when one candidate receives a majority of the votes in the primary, only one candidate
qualifies and the state is not required to place the single qualified candidate on the November ballot. We disagree.
The state's argument that the actual election occurs on the federal election day is refuted by the language of the
Louisiana Election Code which states that "[a] candidate who receives a majority of the votes cast for an office in
a primary election is elected."
We agree with appellants that the Louisiana election system, as applied to elections for congressmen, conflicts
with the federal statutes that establish a uniform federal election day and thwarts the congressional purpose of
establishing a uniform day to prevent earlier elections from influencing later voters. Thus, the Louisiana system
as applied to federal elections must yield under the Supremacy Clause.
III.
Having decided that the Louisiana open primary election scheme conflicts with 2 U.S.C. ss 1, 7, we now turn to
a consideration of the appropriate remedy. Appellants contend that this court should declare the 1978 Louisiana
election code invalid and reinstate the pre-1978 election law. This drastic remedy would require us to radically
overhaul the state's election procedure and reinstate an election system which the state abolished eighteen years ago.
In exercising our discretion in granting or withholding an injunction we balance "the conveniences of the parties
and possible injuries to them according as they may be affected by the granting or withholding of the injunction."
Courts should be particularly loathe to preempt a state legislative task such as establishing an election scheme.
Even in reapportionment cases where the voters' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection is infringed,
federal courts frequently give the state an opportunity to remedy the defect before fashioning a judicial remedy.
In addition to this federalism concern, a number of additional factors weigh against the issuance of an injunction:
(1) The campaign for statewide and federal offices for the September 21 open primary election is well underway.
Qualification date for candidates for those offices closed on Friday, July 12, 1996. Enjoining that election would
be expensive for the candidates and the State. Ordering another election at a different time would also be confusing
to the voters. (2) By contrast, the injury to the plaintiffs will be relatively minimal. To be assured of participating
in the election of their representatives and senators, plaintiffs must vote on September 21. But they have the right
to vote in those elections on that date and if they do so, their vote will count. If plaintiffs' representatives and
senators are elected on September 21, they will be required to return to the polls on November 5 to vote in the
presidential election. However, compared with the cost of enjoining the September 21 election, two trips to the
polls is a relatively minor cost.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment that Louisiana's
election scheme conflicts with 2 U.S.C. ss 1, 7 to the extent that the Louisiana scheme authorizes a contested
election for members of Congress to be decided in the open primary before the uniform federal election day. The
next scheduled session of the Louisiana legislature is in May 1997. We remand this case to the district court with
directions to reconsider plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief if the state has not acted to resolve the conflict within
a reasonable time after the 1997 legislative session. We also remand all remaining issues in this case to the district
court.
REVERSED and RENDERED.
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